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DEATH IS DIFFERENT NO LONGER: ABOLISHING
THE INSANITY DEFENSE IS CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL UNDER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
Elizabeth Bennion*
INTRODUCTION
The attempted assassination of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords,
which left six dead and fourteen wounded at the outset of 2011, thrust
mental illness issues into the national spotlight.' The nation turned a
momentary gaze on its severely mentally ill because a mentally im-
balanced person had committed a horrific act that shocked, outraged,
and saddened the public.2 The fact that mental illness rarely acquires
broad-based media attention except under similar circumstances can
distort both popular conceptions of the issues and the laws legislatures
pass in reaction to a public outcry. 3 For example, when the mentally
imbalanced John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity
after his attempted assassination of then-President Ronald Reagan,
legislatures in several states eliminated the insanity defense alto-
* Elizabeth Bennion is currently clerking for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit and will be working as a Fellow at BYU Law School. She most gratefully acknowl-
edges and dedicates this Article to the memory of Brian Taylor, without whom this work would
never have come to fruition.
1. See Terry Frieden, Holder Cites 'Senseless and Shameful' Act in Tucson, CNN.com (Jan. 11,
2011, 3:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/01/11/arizona.holder.
2. See Kate Pickert & John Cloud, If You Think Someone Is Mentally Ill: Loughner's Six
Warning Signs, TIME (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2041733,00.
html?artId=2041733?contType=article?chn=us.
3. Because of this trend in media coverage, it may seem to the public that the mentally ill are
a rare and violent breed, but statistics show just the opposite. See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E.
GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS
OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
mhppji.pdf; Michael J. Fitzpatrick, The Arizona Tragedy and Mental Health Care, NAT'L
ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (NAMI), http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=press
room&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=113184 (last visited
July 1, 2011) ("The U.S. Surgeon General has reported that the likelihood of violence from
people with mental illness is low. In fact, the overall contribution of mental disorders to the total
level of violence in society is exceptionally small. Acts of violence are exceptional. They are a
sign that something has gone terribly wrong, usually in the mental healthcare system." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Mental Illness: Facts and Numbers, NAMI, http://www.
nami.org/Template.cfmSection=About Mental_Illness&Template=/ContentManagement/Con
tentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=53155 (last visited July 1, 2011).
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gether,4 while other lawmakers (including Congress) severely re-
stricted the defense.5  Some of these changes are arguably
unconstitutional, especially given the logic of a 2010 U.S. Supreme
Court case: Graham v. Florida.6 This Article argues that, at minimum,
the absolute abolishment of insanity as an independent defense is un-
constitutionally cruel and unusual under Graham's reasoning.
Graham did not address the mentally ill, but much of its reasoning
is remarkably applicable to that population. Indeed, in some in-
stances, the reasoning provided in Graham makes the severely men-
tally ill stronger candidates for special protections than the juveniles
to whom protection was awarded. Justice Thomas foresaw such ex-
tensions of its reasoning when he decried in dissent: "'Death is differ-
ent' no longer."7 Graham held only that juveniles who have not been
convicted of homicide must not be sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole.8 But Justice Thomas recognized that this
broke new ground in Supreme Court jurisprudence; never before had
a defined category of people been protected by constitutional rule
from a specific punishment other than death. Justice Thomas stated
that "[tihe Court now claims not only the power categorically to re-
serve the 'most severe punishment' for those the Court thinks are 'the
most deserving of execution,' but also to declare that 'less culpable'
persons are categorically exempt from the 'second most severe pen-
alty."' 9 Joined only by Justice Scalia in this part of his dissent,10 Jus-
tice Thomas further objected that "[n]o reliable limiting principle
remains to prevent the Court from immunizing any class of offenders
from the law's third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe penalties as
well.""
While this Article argues that Justice Thomas is mistaken in his con-
clusion that there are no limiting principles to the types of classes that
may be protected and the severity of penalties that may be imposed
under Graham, it also argues that he is correct that the case's reason-
ing logically leads to constitutional protection of another group: those
4. See Brenda C. Desmond & Paul J. Lenz, Mental Health Courts: An Effective Way for Treat-
ing Offenders with Serious Mental Illness, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 525, 525
(2010).
5. Id.
6. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
7. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2034 (majority opinion).
9. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 568 (2005)).
10. Justice Alito also dissented in a separate opinion but joined Parts I and III of Justice
Thomas's dissent. Id. at 2043, 2058.
11. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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suffering from severe mental illness. Part II examines the historical
development of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause jurispru-
dence, highlighting the battles within the Court that led to the Jus-
tices' positions in Graham as well as noting relevant references to
mental illness.12 Part III presents an in-depth analysis of the princi-
ples and rules arising out of Graham and how the case has changed
the playing field. 13 Part IV applies the rules and principles derived
from Graham to show why the case logically requires the conclusion
that abolishment of insanity defenses is unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual. It also briefly examines which states have abolished the de-
fense and why the reasoning of their supreme court opinions cannot
withstand a Graham analysis.14
II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT BEFORE
GRAHAM v. FLORIDA
Graham broke new ground. Its significance is best understood in
context of the historical tensions in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
that existed before Justice Kennedy wrote the five-Justice majority
opinion in that case.15 This Part examines that history while also high-
lighting references to mental illness within the cases preceding Gra-
ham. Fascinatingly, even when mental illness is in no way related to
the facts of a case, it is often brought up in passages discussing the
proper reach of constitutional protections. 16 As Part IV discusses, the
reason for this seemingly irrelevant inclusion of mental illness discus-
sions in cases where no defendant suffered from such an affliction is
that prosecution of the severely mentally ill goes to the heart of ques-
tions central to determining what constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment-questions regarding levels of accountability and proper
purposes of punishment.' 7 These are questions that legal scholars
have grappled with for centuries, often turning to varying examples of
12. See infra notes 15-165 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 166-236 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 237-368 and accompanying text.
15. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment but did not join in Justice Kennedy's
opinion, technically making Graham a 6-3 decision. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017, 2036. The
concurrence is based on dramatically different reasoning. Although Chief Justice Roberts
agreed that it would be cruel and unusual punishment to sentence the juvenile in Graham to life-
without-parole, he did so on the basis of a specific analysis of the facts and circumstances, and
did not support the idea of a categorical protection of juveniles from that sentence. See id. at
2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-37 (1968) (plurality opinion); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
17. See infra notes 237-368 and accompanying text.
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mental illness to demonstrate where proper boundaries should be
drawn.
A. Noncapital Eighth Amendment Cases Before the Birth of the
"Death Is Different" Doctrine
The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."' 8 Before Graham, when cases challenged a sentence
as cruel and unusual, the Supreme Court struggled over whether, and
to what extent, a proportionality principle should apply. 19 The na-
tion's highest court first employed a proportionality principle in the
early twentieth century.20 In Weems v. United States, the appellant
had been convicted of falsifying a public document.21 His sentence
included 15 years of "hard and painful labor" in chains at the ankle
and wrist both night and day, as well as the permanent loss of certain
civil rights.22 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the "cruel and unusual" prohibition only applied to such punish-
ments as being disemboweled, burned alive, or ones that "involve tor-
ture or a lingering death." 23 Although the Court noted that the
Eighth Amendment may refer to "something inhuman and barba-
rous," 24 such as torture, it also approvingly cited language stating that
the phrase prohibits "all punishments which by their excessive length
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19. See Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolv-
ing Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 87 (2010) (ex-
plaining that, after a 1962 Supreme Court case on the subject, "the nine [J]ustices traded blows
for the next three decades over the existence and scope of a proportionality principle in non-
capital Eighth Amendment cases").
20. Earlier cases had suggested that such a principle should be employed. See, e.g., Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) ("[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture,... and all
others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitu-
tion." (emphasis added)); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
21. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1910). "Weems is a landmark case because
it represents the first time that the Court invalidated a penalty prescribed by a legislature for a
particular offense. The Court made it plain beyond any reasonable doubt that excessive punish-
ments were as objectionable as those that were inherently cruel." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). An earlier case, Howard v. Fleming, seemed also to
employ a proportionality analysis in considering the nature of the crime as compared to the
punishment, but it upheld the ten-year sentence for conspiracy to defraud. 191 U.S. 126, 135-36
(1903). Wilkerson v. Utah had also commented on the difficulty of defining the boundaries of
cruel and unusual punishments, but asserted that "torture, . . . and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution." 99 U.S. at 135-36
(emphasis added).
22. Weems, 217 U.S. at 358, 364.
23. Id. at 370-71.
24. Id. at 368.
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or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged....
The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the
bail required or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted." 2 5 The Court
observed that "[t]he clause of the Constitution ... may be . . . progres-
sive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." 26 In exam-
ining a more proportionate sentence for a like crime, the Court stated
that "[t]he purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by
penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented,
and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal." 27
These themes-inherently barbarous treatment, a proportionality
principle, evolving concepts of humane justice, hope for reformation,
and the purposes of punishment-would recur repeatedly in the Su-
preme Court's Eighth Amendment cases with varying results.2 8 More
than 50 years later, the Court reasserted the proportionality principle
in another noncapital case. The Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibited punishing an individual for the status of being an ad-
dict in Robinson v. California.2 9 However, the Court also clarified
that the act of consuming illegal drugs could be criminalized.3 0 The
dominant theory seemed to be that it was unconstitutional to punish
the status of being an addict because that status is beyond an addict's
control.31 As Justice Stewart explained:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would at-
tempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or
a leper . . . . A State might determine that the general health and
welfare require that the victims of these . . . human afflictions be
dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confine-
ment, or sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human
knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease
would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel
25. Id. at 371 (quoting O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting)). The O'Neil majority
did not reach the question of cruel and unusual punishment, but the dissent argued that there
should be a proportionality principle that goes beyond outlawing such punishments "as the rack,
the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with
acute pain and suffering." O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 339 (Field, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments should prevent "all punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Id. at
339-40.
26. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
27. Id. at 381.
28. See infra notes 29-236 and accompanying text.
29. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
30. Id.
31. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 32
Justice Stewart further explained that drug addiction is "an illness
which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily," and therefore,
any imprisonment would be cruel and unusual: "Even one day in
prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of hav-
ing a common cold." 33
Interestingly, most Justices-whether concurring or dissenting in
Robinson-reiterated the importance of control in their analyses. Jus-
tice Douglas, concurring, drew comparisons between drug addicts and
the mentally ill. He quoted a nineteenth-century doctor: "Nothing
can more strongly illustrate the popular ignorance respecting insanity
than the proposition, equally objectionable in its humanity and its
logic, that the insane should be punished for criminal acts, in order to
deter other insane persons from doing the same thing." 34 The implica-
tion being that there can be no deterrence where there is no control.
Justice Douglas admitted, "[W]e have our differences over the legal
definition of insanity. But however insanity is defined, it is in end
effect treated as a disease. While afflicted people may be confined
either for treatment or for the protection of society, they are not
branded as criminals." 35
Likewise, Justice Clark emphasized the importance of control in his
dissent when he stated, "There was no suggestion that the term 'nar-
cotic addict' as here used included a person who acted without voli-
tion or who had lost the power of self-control." 3 6 Justice White's
dissent did the same, stating, "If appellant's conviction rested upon
sheer status, condition or illness or if he was convicted for being an
addict who had lost his power of self-control, I would have other
thoughts about this case."37 Justice Harlan alone was unclear whether
lack of control ought to play a role in the analysis. He concluded that
the statute at issue was unconstitutional in that it "authorize[d] crimi-
32. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 667.
34. Id. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting ISAAc RAY, TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 56 (5th ed. 1871)).
35. Id. at 668-69. Justice Douglas further stated, "If addicts can be punished for their addic-
tion, then the insane can also be punished for their insanity. Each has a disease and each must be
treated as a sick person." Id. at 674 (emphasis added). "We would forget the teachings of the
Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be
punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action." Id.
at 678.
36. Id. at 680 (Clark, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 685 (White, J., dissenting).
6 [Vol. 61:1
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nal punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal act" without
any accompanying illegal act.38
Some have argued that the Court soon backed away from this con-
trol emphasis in Powell v. Texas.39 That retreat, however, was largely
illusory. A careful analysis of the one-Justice concurrence and the
four-Justice dissent in Powell reveals that, even though the three-
Justice lead opinion (and a concurrence by two of the same Justices
who joined the lead opinion) dismissed the idea of capacity to control
one's actions as playing a role in the analysis, a majority of the Justices
did not do so. Because the lead opinion decided the case's outcome,
some have overemphasized its reasoning, failing to note that the dis-
sent's reasoning (combined with a concurrence) actually held a major-
ity in declaring that the uncontrollable consequences of a disease
cannot be punished.
Powell involved a law that outlawed public drunkenness. 40 The ma-
jority decided that such a law was not an unconstitutional punishment
of alcohol addiction in violation of Robinson.41 The dissent insisted
that Robinson included a principle that "[c]riminal penalties may not
be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to
change." 42 As discussed above, Robinson dwelt on the concept of
self-control, its relation to accountability, and the purposes of punish-
ment. The lead opinion in Powell rejected any capacity-based analysis
and adopted another principle from Robinson: "penalties may be in-
flicted only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in
some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing . .. .. 43
Despite disavowing any relevance self-control had to the analysis,
the lead opinion spent a remarkable amount of space arguing that
there was insufficient evidence to conclude that chronic alcoholics
truly lack free will in their actions. 44 It was just after such a passage
that the three-Justice lead opinion inserted dicta regarding insanity
that would be relied upon by state supreme courts in upholding an
abolishment of the insanity defense more than three decades later.45
38. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1076
(2007).
40. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 537.
42. Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 533 (plurality opinion).
44. See, e.g., id. at 518-35.
45. The four state supreme courts that have upheld an abolishment of the insanity defense are
Montana, Utah, Kansas, and Idaho. See infra notes 353-68 and accompanying text.
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And in any event this Court has never articulated a general consti-
tutional doctrine of mens rea.
... The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justifica-
tion, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly
shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the
criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medi-
cal views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has al-
ways been thought to be the province of the States.
Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled
into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms. Yet,
that task would seem to follow inexorably from an extension of
Robinson to this case. If a person in the "condition" of being a
chronic alcoholic cannot be criminally punished as a constitutional
matter for being drunk in public, it would seem to follow that a
person who contends that, in terms of one test, his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect, would state an issue
of constitutional dimension with regard to his criminal responsibility
had he been tried under some different and perhaps lesser standard,
e.g., the right-wrong test of M'Naghten's Case.... [F]ormulating a
constitutional rule would reduce, if not eliminate, that fruitful ex-
perimentation, and freeze the developing productive dialogue be-
tween law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold. It is
simply not yet the time to write into the Constitution formulas cast
in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear either
to doctors or to lawyers. 46
The reasons that this dicta should not support a finding that abolish-
ment of the insanity defense is constitutional are explored later in this
46. Powell, 392 U.S. at 535-37 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Justice Harlan, who had joined the majority opinion, also joined Justice Black's
concurring opinion that stated:
[A] form of the insanity defense would be made a constitutional requirement throughout
the Nation, should the Court now hold it cruel and unusual to punish a person afflicted
with any mental disease whenever his conduct was part of the pattern of his disease and
occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the disease. Such a holding would appear
to overrule Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), where the majority opinion and the
dissenting opinion in which I joined both stressed the indefensibility of imposing on the
States any particular test of criminal responsibility.
. . . [T]he proposed new constitutional rule would be devastating, for constitutional
questions would be raised by every state effort to regulate the admissibility of evidence
relating to "disease" and "compulsion," and by every state attempt to explain these
concepts in instructions to the jury.
Id. at 545-46 (Black, J., concurring) (emphases added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Again, the language regarding insanity was dicta and not the majority view in Powell. Justice
Black expressed no opinion as to whether it would be constitutional to abolish the insanity de-
fense altogether. The implication of some of Justice Black's reasoning-including the notion
that moral blameworthiness should not be a constitutional requirement for criminal behavior-
was certainly not supported by a majority of the Justices. See id. at 541, 544-45.
[Vol. 61:18
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Article,4 7 but as an initial point, the lead opinion's reasoning regard-
ing insanity did not carry a majority-despite carrying the day in
terms of its conclusion regarding the constitutionality of the law at
issue. Furthermore, the passage only argued for no mandated form of
the insanity defense;4 8 it did not address whether states could abolish
the defense altogether.
In Justice White's concurrence in Powell, he rejected the idea that
self-control played no role in the constitutional analysis and the idea
that it should simply be left to state experimentation with forms of
mens rea.4 9 Justice White opined, "Punishing an addict for using drugs
convicts for addiction under a different name. Distinguishing between
the two crimes is like forbidding criminal conviction for being sick
with flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for running a fever or
having a convulsion."5 0 Justice White did, however, believe that an
addict could control the place of his consumption-or that, at least in
this case, there was nothing to suggest the defendant "could not have
done his drinking in private."5 1 Therefore, Justice White agreed that
this defendant's Eighth Amendment claim failed, but his entire analy-
sis rested on a control theory.52
The four-Justice dissent argued for reversal because the defendant
was a chronic alcoholic who violated the law at issue not out of voli-
tion, "but under a compulsion symptomatic of [his] disease."53 The
dissenting Justices found the case indistinguishable from Robinson be-
cause "in both cases the particular defendant was accused of being in
a condition which he had no capacity to change or avoid." 5 4 Regard-
less of whether Mr. Powell had the capacity to control his actions in
becoming drunk and appearing in public, it is significant that a five-
Justice majority based their conclusions on whether volition was in-
volved-seeing that issue as one of constitutional concern and not a
mens rea issue best left to the states.
47. See infra notes 307-68 and accompanying text; see also State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 379
(Utah 1995) (Stewart, Associate C.J., dissenting) ("Not one of the cases cited deals with the right
of the United States or of a state to abolish the defense of insanity.").
48. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 535-37 (plurality opinion).
49. See id. at 548-54 (White, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 548.
51. Id. at 553.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 568 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
54. Powell, 392 U.S. at 568.
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B. Birth of the "Death Is Different" Doctrine and
Related Insanity References
Not long after the dueling decisions of Robinson and Powell, and in
the Supreme Court's first occasion to revisit the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause after Powell, the doctrine of "death is different"
arose. It first made its appearance in Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Furman v. Georgia.55 This case's 5-4 per curiam opinion
effectively halted capital punishment in the United States for a brief
period of years. 56 Justice Stewart's concurrence stated:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevoca-
bility. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a
basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its
absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
humanity.57
Using this idea that death is uniquely set apart from all other types
of punishment, the Supreme Court later required certain procedural
safeguards58 and exempted several categories of people from the
death penalty's reach. 59 Some of these categories dealt with the sever-
ity of the crime committed, 60 but more relevant to the current analysis
are those cases that made distinctions based only on the qualities of
55. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
56. The approximately four-year moratorium came to an end with the decision in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that the punishment of death for the crime of murder does
not always violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
57. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). The reasoning among those concurring
with the per curiam judgment varied widely, and only Justices Marshall and Brennan believed
the death penalty was an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment in all cases. Id. at
305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring), 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). In evaluating the cruelty of
the death penalty, Justice Brennan noted that "the onset of insanity while awaiting execution of
a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon." Id. at 288-89 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Justice Marshall also
pointed to the costly process of detecting and curing insanity in order to execute convicts be-
cause of the "formally established policy of not executing insane persons." Id. at 358 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (requiring that a
sentencer be empowered to take into account all mitigating circumstances); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting the death penalty as the
mandatory punishment for any crime).
59. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (plurality opinion).
60. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) ("As it relates to crimes against
individuals, ... the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim's life was
not taken."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (prohibiting the death penalty for
felony murder absent a showing that the defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of
mind); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (prohibiting capital punishment for rape of an
adult woman).
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the people facing the punishment. The death penalty cannot presently
be imposed as a punishment on those who committed their crimes
(whatever they may be) before age 18,61 nor on those who are men-
tally retarded as clinically defined in Atkins v. Virginia.62 Further-
more, although sentenced to death, a person may not be executed
while insane. 63
The first case introducing categorical exclusions based on the quali-
ties of the defendant was Ford v. Wainwright. The case involved a
defendant who did not claim to have been insane at the time he com-
mitted his crime, nor at the time of his trial.64 The Court considered
only the narrow question of whether people may be executed while
they are insane and, if not, what procedural rights attached in the de-
termination of insanity.65 Relying heavily on the fact that "[f]or cen-
turies no jurisdiction has countenanced the execution of the insane," 66
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment would be violated by such
an execution.67 The Court not only found that centuries of consensus
in Anglo-American law on this point provided an originalist argument
that the founding fathers would have meant to include this prohibition
within the meaning of "cruel and unusual" treatment, but also ac-
knowledged that it may look to modern national values with respect
to the practice.68 As evidence of these "impressive historical creden-
tials," 69 the majority opinion quoted Sir William Blackstone, an
eighteenth-century British scholar studied by multiple American
founding fathers:70
[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if com-
mitted when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself.
Also, if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and
before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be ar-
raigned for it: because he is not able to plead to it with that advice
and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the pris-
oner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make his
defence? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses
before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after
61. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
62. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
63. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 401-02.
65. See id. at 410.
66. Id. at 401.
67. Id. at 408-10.
68. Id. at 405-06.
69. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406.
70. See Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 293, 298 (2009).




judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be
stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had
the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged some-
thing in stay of judgment or execution.7'
The opinion also quotes Sir Edward Coke, who had earlier expressed
similar views regarding English common law. He wrote that punish-
ment is meant as an example to society "but so it is not when a mad
man is executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against
Law, and of extre[me] inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example
to others." 7 2
The majority of Justices agreed that although there was consensus
against the practice of executing people while insane, there was varia-
tion in the reasoning behind the prohibition,73 including society's con-
cept of humanity; the lack of deterrence value; the questionable
retributive value of executing people who lack comprehension of why
society is punishing them; and the natural abhorrence of executing
people who are unable to prepare themselves mentally and spiritually
for death.74 "Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear
and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity
of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the
restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment."75
The other two cases involving categorical, characteristics-based
prohibitions were all the more remarkable in that they overturned re-
cent Supreme Court precedent. On the same day in 1989, the Su-
preme Court handed down two opinions regarding the death penalty:
Stanford v. Kentucky76 (which allowed the death penalty for 16- and
17-year-olds) and Penry v. Lynaugh77 (which allowed the death pen-
alty for the mentally retarded). Thirteen years later, Atkins v. Virginia
overturned Penry based on a "death is different" analysis.78 Three
years after Atkins, Roper v. Simmons overturned Stanford.79
In justifying the sea change Atkins represented, Justice Stevens, de-
livering the 6-3 opinion of the Court, explained:
71. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-07 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24-25 (1769)).
72. Id. at 407 (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).
73. See id. at 407-10.
74. Id. at 407-09.
75. Id. at 410.
76. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005).
77. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
78. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21.
79. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
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Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements
for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they
commit crimes. Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning,
judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act
with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most seri-
ous adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeop-
ardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against
mentally retarded defendants. Presumably for these reasons, in the
13 years since we decided Penry v. Lynaugh, the American public,
legislators, scholars, and judges have deliberated over the question
whether the death penalty should ever be imposed on a mentally
retarded criminal. The consensus reflected in those deliberations
informs our answer to the question presented by this case: whether
such executions are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.80
The implication of Justice Stevens's opening words was that the re-
versal was justified at least in part by a shift in the national consensus.
While even Justice Scalia's scathing dissent (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) would not disagree that a true shift in
national consensus would justify expansion of the cruel and unusual
prohibitions,"' the Justices vehemently disagreed on whether an actual
shift had occurred.
Both sides relied on the same numbers: 18 states had recently
passed legislation barring execution of the mentally retarded;82 20
states allowed sentencing judges or juries to decide whether execution
was warranted;83 and 12 states barred capital punishment altogether. 84
Thus, it was true that a 30-state majority did not allow execution of
the mentally retarded. But Justice Scalia emphasized that only 47%
of the 38 states that permitted capital punishment barred execution of
the mentally retarded. 5 This seemed a strained way to interpret the
statistics because clearly the states opposed to capital punishment al-
together were also opposed to capital punishment of the mentally
retarded.
Nevertheless, the majority also seemed uncomfortable relying on a
30-state majority alone to find national consensus.86 They therefore
drew from several other sources for determining a consensus, includ-
80. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07 (citation omitted).
81. See id. at 339-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 314-16 (majority opinion), 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), 342 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
83. See id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 314-15 (majority opinion), 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (majority opinion) ("It is not so much the number of these
States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.").
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ing "the consistency of the direction of change" among legislatures;87
the fact that this movement happened despite anticrime legislation be-
ing far more popular than legislation protecting those who commit
violent crimes;88 the "overwhelming[ ]" votes among state legislatures
in favor of prohibition;89 the uncommon practice of actually executing
the mentally retarded even in those states that allowed it;90 the posi-
tions taken by medical, religious, and international groups; and na-
tionwide polls of American citizens.91
Justice Scalia and his fellow dissenters objected to going so far be-
yond the "statutes passed by society's elected representatives" in
searching for national consensus.92 Indeed, Atkins was a dramatic de-
parture from precedent in that respect. Even the majority acknowl-
edged that "evolving standards should be informed by objective
factors to the maximum possible extent"93 and that "the clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legisla-
tion enacted by the country's legislatures." 9 4 The bolstering of the
national-consensus argument with other factors beyond legislation
seemed to indicate the majority's discomfort with equating national
consensus with a bare majority consensus among states.
While the dissent was unhappy with these forays into new territory
in finding national consensus, it was even more disturbed by the ma-
jority's conclusion, drawn from Coker v. Georgia, "that the objective
evidence, though of great importance, did not 'wholly determine' the
controversy, 'for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the accepta-
bility of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." 95 While
the dissent viewed this as free license to dictate the law according to
personal biases,96 the majority seemed to view this as an important
constitutional check on mass opinion.97 In this independent analysis,
the Court found two reasons to support the perceived shift in national
consensus. First, the Court questioned whether either of the two rec-
ognized penal purposes of the death penalty-retribution and deter-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 315-16.
89. Id. at 316.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 316 n.21.
92. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
370 (1989)).
93. Id. at 312 (majority opinion) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
96. Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 321 (majority opinion).
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rence-applied to the mentally retarded. 98 These individuals'
diminished culpability undermined retributive goals, and the impair-
ments that resulted in this reduced culpability also made it less likely
that the threat of capital punishment would deter them from crimes.99
Second, those same qualities interfered with their ability to assist in
their own defense, thus increasing the likelihood of wrongful execu-
tions.100 The Court seemed careful to tie its independent findings to
the national consensus, stating, "Our independent evaluation of the
issue reveals no reason to disagree with the judgment of the legisla-
tures that have recently addressed the matter and concluded that
death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded
criminal."10'
Justice Scalia made an interesting criticism of the majority's unwill-
ingness to leave the matter of execution of the mentally retarded in
the hands of judges and juries. He said the majority position
contradicts the immemorial belief, here and in England, that [judges
and juries] play an indispensable role in such matters: "[It is very
difficult to define the indivisible line that divides perfect and partial
insanity; but it must rest upon circumstances duly to be weighed and
considered both by the judge and jury, lest on the one side there be
a kind of inhumanity towards the defects of human nature, or on the
other side too great an indulgence given to great crimes . . . .
This is a clear endorsement of the position that insanity determina-
tions should be a jury question. At the end of his dissent, Justice
Scalia reiterated that
[n]othing has changed the accuracy of Matthew Hale's endorsement
of the common law's traditional method for taking account of guilt-
reducing factors, written over three centuries ago: "[Determination
of a person's incapacity] is a matter of great difficulty, partly from
the easiness of counterfeiting this disability . . . and partly from the
variety of the degrees of this infirmity, whereof some are sufficient,
and some are insufficient to excuse persons in capital offenses....
"Yet the law of England hath afforded the best method of trial, that
is possible, of this and all other matters of fact, namely, by a jury of
twelve men all concurring in the same judgment, by the testimony
98. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19.
99. Id. at 320 ("[Tlhe same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these defendants
less morally culpable-for example, the diminished ability to understand and process informa-
tion, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses- . . . also
make it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a
penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.").
100. Id. at 320-21.
101. Id. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting 1 MATTHEW HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 30 (1st Am. ed. 1847)).
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of witnesses . . . , and by the inspection and direction of the
judge." 03
This quote goes even further in acknowledging that the worst forms of
insanity will excuse even otherwise capital offenses.
Three Terms after Atkins was decided, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to reconsider whether the oldest juveniles could be exe-
cuted. In 1988, a plurality of the Court determined that evolving stan-
dards of decency prohibited the execution of offenders under age 16
at the time of their crime. 104 But the following year, the Court held in
a 5-4 decision that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execu-
tion of juveniles aged 16 and 17.105 In the latter case, Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, the Court rejected the idea that any national consensus had
developed against the practice, noting that 15 of the 37 death-penalty-
allowing states prohibited the punishment for 16-year-olds and 12
states prohibited it for 17-year-olds.10 6 Three Justices joined Justice
Scalia in adamantly rejecting any suggestion that the Court should ex-
ercise independent judgment as to whether juvenile executions were
cruel and unusual.107
Only 15 years had passed since that decision when Roper v. Sim-
mons came before the Court, and not much had changed in the na-
tional legislative picture regarding juvenile death penalties.10
However, there had been significant changes in the boundaries of the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in those intervening years,
and Roper would further expand those boundaries.
Relying on the much-loosened standards for establishing national
consensus that had been introduced in Atkins, Roper loosened those
standards further still. The majority opinion correctly highlighted
some significant similarities in the numbers. In both Atkins and
Roper, 30 states prohibited the death penalty for the relevant popula-
tion.109 Of those 30 states, 12 rejected the death penalty altogether
and 18 generally allowed a death penalty but excluded the relevant
population from its reach by either express legislation or judicial inter-
pretation.110 In both cases only a small number of states had actually
executed offenders in the respective classes in the recent past-6
states had executed juveniles in the 16 years since Stanford, and 5
103. Id. at 354 (alterations in original) (quoting HALE, supra note 102, at 32-33).
104. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion).
105. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
106. See id. at 370-71.
107. See id. at 377-78.
108. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608-15 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 564 (majority opinion) (comparing the relevant numbers to Atkins).
110. Id.
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states had executed mentally retarded individuals in the 13 years prior
to Atkins. II
But the similarities ended there. Atkins had actually downplayed
the numbers issue (presumably because so many state legislatures had
laws on the books contradicting the "national consensus") by pointing
to the astounding pace and consistency of legislation-16 states had
banned execution of the mentally retarded in the 13 years prior to that
decision, and there was "virtually no countervailing evidence of af-
firmative legislative support for this practice."11 2 By contrast, in
Roper only 5 states that previously permitted juvenile capital punish-
ment had reversed course,113 and 2 states had reaffirmed their support
of the practice by enacting statutes that allowed 16-year-olds to face
the possibility of execution.11 4 At least 7 states had statutes explicitly
allowing capital punishment for 16- and 17-year-olds, and 5 of the 7
had juveniles on death row.115 When the Court heard Roper, there
were over 70 juveniles on death row in 12 states.1 16 Thus, there were
considerable differences in the momentum and direction of change
between the cases-differences that Atkins had highlighted and relied
on to justify national consensus and that Roper downplayed to achieve
the same result.117
The majority in Roper made the strong point that the difference in
pace of state reversals might simply be due to the fact that society
broadly recognized "the inappropriateness of the death penalty for
juveniles . . . sooner than it was recognized for the mentally retarded"
and that "[i]t would be the ultimate in irony" if this were to become a
reason for continuing the execution of juveniles while protecting the
mentally retarded from such a fate.""s However, it could not and did
not attempt to account for the differences regarding affirmative legis-
lative acts by certain states regarding juvenile executions. The fact
111. Id. at 595 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 595-97.
113. Four of these states implemented new legislation banning the death penalty for all
juveniles, and one reached the same result through judicial interpretation. Id. at 565 (majority
opinion). The federal government implemented similar legislative bans in the same era. Id. at
597 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114. Roper, 543 U.S. at 596.
115. Id. at 595-96.
116. Id. at 596.
117. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) ("It is not so much the number of
these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."), with Roper, 543
U.S. at 566 ("Any difference between this case and Atkins with respect to the pace of abolition is
thus counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the change.").




was that both Atkins and Roper involved numeric analyses that
seemed to leave the Justices somewhat uncomfortable because the re-
quirements of national consensus were straying so far from any sem-
blance of near unanimity among the nation's legislatures. Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Roper acutely observed that the only rational
explanation for the outcome in both Atkins and Roper was that some-
thing else was tipping the scales: the independent judgment of the
Court as to what the Constitution required. 119
Justice O'Connor's dissent was particularly interesting in that she
switched sides from Atkins to Roper. She supported finding the death
penalty as cruel and unusual for the mentally retarded, but did not
support the same finding for capital punishment of the oldest juvenile
offenders. Although she objected to the weaker evidence of national
consensus in Roper as giving "reason for pause,"120 she believed
neither case's punishment could have qualified as cruel and unusual
without the majority's independent constitutional analysis of moral
proportionalityl 21-which includes "the notion that the magnitude of
the punishment imposed must be related to the degree of the harm
inflicted on the victim, as well as to the degree of the defendant's
blameworthiness."1 22 This independent analysis, according to Justice
O'Connor, was not simply "a rubber stamp on the tally of legislative
and jury actions. Rather, it is an integral part of the Eighth Amend-
ment inquiry-and one that is entitled to independent weight in
reaching [the Court's] ultimate decision."1 23
She did not, however, completely divorce the concepts of national
consensus and independent judicial review in this dissent. She wrote
that "the force of the proportionality argument in Atkins significantly
bolstered the Court's confidence that the objective evidence in that
case did, in fact, herald the emergence of a genuine national consen-
sus."12 4 So although she was giving judicial analysis independent
weight, this comment suggested that the judicial analysis, in her view,
was to simply confirm otherwise shaky grounds for national consensus
and could not be grounds for an Eighth Amendment violation com-
pletely divorced of some finding of national consensus. There was no
need for her to make this distinction more explicit, however, for in
119. See id. at 597 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120. Id. Justice O'Connor believed that there was no "genuine national consensus" in Roper.
Id. at 604.
121. See id. at 597.
122. Id. at 590 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 815 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
123. Id. at 597.
124. Roper, 543 U.S. at 598.
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Roper she differed with the majority both on grounds of national con-
sensus and moral proportionality.125
In the majority's moral proportionality analysis, the Court in Roper
found juveniles to be less culpable than adult offenders and therefore
less deserving of the death penalty on three grounds.126 First, the
Court reasoned that "as any parent knows and as the scientific and
sociological studies . . . tend to confirm," 127 youth are generally less
mature and responsible than adults, "often result[ing] in impetuous
and ill-considered actions and decisions." 128 The Court emphasized
that such behavior is "more understandable among the young." 129
Second, the young "are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," partly due
to "hav[ing] less control, or less experience with control, over their
own environment."l 3 0 Third, "the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult. [Their] personality traits . . . are more
transitory, less fixed."T31 Juveniles who commit crimes are thus less
likely than adults to have an "irretrievably depraved character." 132
All these factors led the Court to conclude that a juvenile's bad acts
are "not as morally reprehensible" as the same acts by adults.133 The
Court gave great weight in this analysis to the fact that juveniles have
a greater possibility of reformation than adults because the impetu-
ous, reckless inclinations of youth often subside in later years. 134
The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to
receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability. An unac-
ceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature
of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments
based on youth . . . , even where the juvenile offender's objective
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require
a sentence less severe than death.135
In their dissents, both Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia differed
from the majority on this point; both thought the question of capital
punishment for the oldest juveniles should be properly left with legis-
125. Id. at 604.
126. Id. at 569-70 (majority opinion).
127. Id. at 569.
128. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
129. Id. at 569-70 (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367).
130. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
131. Id. at 570.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 572-73.
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latures, then with juries on a case-by-case basis only if legislatures so
authorize.136 Justice O'Connor's reasons for supporting the moral
proportionality of barring capital punishment for the mentally re-
tarded, but not supporting such a bar for juveniles aged 16 and 17, is
relevant to the degree of culpability of the severely mentally ill. At-
kins had cited several definitions of mental retardation, including one
from the American Association of Mental Retardation. It stated:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present func-
tioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or
more of the following applicable adaptive skills areas: communica-
tion, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-
direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.
Mental retardation manifests before age 18.137
This definition prompted Justice O'Connor to see the mentally re-
tarded and 17-year-olds as being in classes that were both "qualita-
tively and materially different." 138 The mentally retarded, she said,
"are defined by precisely the characteristics which render death an ex-
cessive punishment. A mentally retarded person is, 'by definition,'
one whose cognitive and behavioral capacities have been proved to
fall below a certain minimum."139 These characteristics make it
"highly unlikely" that such an individual would be "culpable enough
to deserve the death penalty or that he could have been deterred by
the threat of death." 140 Thus, both of the primary penological goals
relevant to the death penalty-retribution and deterrence-fail to be
sufficient justifications for an execution.
By contrast, while Justice O'Connor certainly agreed that juveniles
are generally less mature and less culpable than adults, she did not
think this "necessarily mean[t] that a 17-year-old murderer cannot be
sufficiently culpable to merit the death penalty."141 Justice O'Connor
conceded that there must be some "age below which no offender, no
matter what his crime, can be deemed to have the cognitive or emo-
tional maturity necessary to warrant the death penalty," but refused to
draw that line "at the margins between adolescence and adulthood"
where there can be such varying degrees of culpability and deterrent
potential. 142 The reasoning of both the majority and Justice
136. Roper, 543 U.S. at 600, 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 620-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (quoting MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFI-
NITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)).
138. Roper, 543 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 599.
142. Id. at 600.
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O'Connor's dissent in Roper support extending certain protections to
the severely mentally ill.14 3
But there were important hurdles that were left for Graham to
cross-first and foremost, the death is different doctrine, which was
alive and well in Roper. The majority opinion explicitly relied on that
doctrine in its reasoning:
Because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the
Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force. Capital punish-
ment must be limited to those offenders who commit "a narrow cat-
egory of the most serious crimes" and whose extreme culpability
makes them "the most deserving of execution." 144
Furthermore, in justifying the abolishment of the death penalty for
juveniles, the opinion explicitly pointed to the deterrent effect of the
then-still-possible life imprisonment without possibility of parole as
"itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person."145 Roper
thus gave no indication that a majority of the Justices would soon be
willing to cross the death barrier and address in a categorical fashion
the second most severe sanction that courts impose.
C. The Question of Proportionality Outside the
"Death Is Different" Doctrine
By the time Graham appeared before the Supreme Court, the scope
of a proportionality analysis outside the context of death was unclear.
In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court had held in a 5-4 opinion that a
mandatory life sentence for a defendant under a Texas recidivist stat-
ute was not cruel and unusual. 14 6 The defendant received his third
conviction after obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. His earlier
crimes had been felonies for fraudulently spending $80 on a credit
card and passing a forged check for $28.36.147 The opinion pointed
out that "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful chal-
lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been ex-
ceedingly rare."' 48 The Court attempted to "draw a 'bright line'
between the punishment of death and the various other permutations
and commutations of punishments short of that ultimate sanction." 4 9
The Court was reluctant to enter the murkier waters of "constitutional
143. See discussion infra Part IV.
144. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
145. Id. at 572.
146. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).
147. Id. at 265-66.
148. Id. at 272.
149. Id. at 275.
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distinction[s] between one term of years and a shorter or longer term
of years" 50 and chose to leave such decisions to legislatures.
But only three years later, the Court reversed course with Solem v.
Helm.151 That case involved a defendant who was facing life impris-
onment-this time without possibility of parole-due to another re-
cidivist statute.152 The defendant had passed a bad check for $100 and
had six prior felony convictions of varying severities.153 In another
5-4 opinion, the Court reiterated that proportionality of punishment
to crime is a "principle . . . deeply rooted and frequently repeated in
common-law jurisprudence."1 5 4 The Court held that the punishment
was cruel and unusual but avoided actually overruling Rummel, distin-
guishing it because in Rummel parole had been potentially available
after twelve years.15 s
The Court swung back again in the opposite direction in another
5-4 opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.156 There, the Court held that a
mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole was not cruel
and unusual for a defendant who was convicted of possessing more
than 650 grams of cocaine, despite the defendant having no prior fel-
ony convictions.157 The Court again tried to limit proportionality re-
view, this time even more forcefully than in Rummel. As Justice
Scalia's opinion stated, "Proportionality review is one of several re-
spects in which we have held that 'death is different,' and have im-
posed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides."158
But Justice Kennedy's concurrence would not allow for a total abol-
ishment of proportionality from noncapital cases. Joined by two other
Justices (and therefore most of the Justices on the prevailing side), he
defended a "narrow proportionality principle" that applies to noncap-
ital sentences.159 He said there was no need for "strict proportionality
between crime and sentence," but "extreme sentences that are
'grossly disproportionate' to the crime" were prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. 160
150. Id.
151. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
152. Id. at 279-82.
153. Id. at 279-81.
154. Id. at 284.
155. Id. at 301. 303.
156. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).
157. Id. at 961, 994-96.
158. Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 996-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288).
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The 5-4 opinions continued with Ewing v. California.161 The Court
held that it was not cruel and unusual to sentence a defendant to
twenty-five years to life for stealing three golf clubs under California's
three strikes law.162 Justice O'Connor delivered the judgment of the
Court, which had a majority, but her opinion garnered the support of
only three Justices. Her opinion explicitly adopted the reasoning of
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin,163 acknowledging a "'nar-
row proportionality principle' that 'applies to noncapital
sentences.'164 But the opinion also emphasized that "[o]utside the
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportion-
ality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare." 165
Thus, when Graham came before the Supreme Court, there was di-
vision among the Justices as to whether, and to what extent, a propor-
tionality principle should apply outside the death is different doctrine.
A careful analysis of the Justices' positions-whether in the majority,
concurrences, or dissents-shows that most thought a proportionality
principle should apply to some extent, but there was great divergence
on how narrow that review should be. No case outside the death is
different context had ever used a proportionality analysis to exclude a
specific population from a certain punishment based on the character-
istics of that group.
III. THE NEW CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT ANALYSIS
FROM GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
A. The Changed Rules Under Graham
Argued at the end of 2009 and decided in 2010, Graham marks the
beginning of a new chapter in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Jus-
tice Thomas, in his dissent, and legal scholars immediately recognized
that the case crossed new boundaries and could potentially have appli-
cation far beyond its own holding.166
Justice Kennedy delivered the judgment and opinion of the Court.
The judgment had a majority of six votes, and his opinion a majority
of five. The difference stemmed from Chief Justice Roberts's view
161. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion).
162. Id. at 30-31.
163. Id. at 23-24.
164. Id. at 20 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
165. Id. at 21 (alteration in original) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
166. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2057 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Smith & Cohen, supra note 19, at 86-87 ("Graham contains the ingredients to be of transforma-
tive significance to the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.... [Graham] could
have far greater significance in the life of the law than in the life of child defendants toiling, for
instance, in the fields of the Florida Penitentiary.").
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that, while life-without-parole was cruel and unusual for this particu-
lar juvenile defendant, there should be no categorical rule emerging
from the case. 167 Justice Kennedy's opinion did create a categorical
exclusion: people who commit nonhomicide crimes before turning age
18 may not receive a sentence of life-without-parole. They must have
some meaningful opportunity of release, even though they may never
actually achieve freedom. "The Eighth Amendment does not fore-
close the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes
committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does
forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those of-
fenders never will be fit to reenter society." 168
Unlike some previous categorical exclusions that instantly removed
certain inmates from death row, this holding could theoretically have
no substantial effect on any inmate's prison sentence. Those juvenile
offenders who have not killed and yet are facing life-without-parole in
prison may never actually qualify for the "meaningful opportunities of
parole" that must now be provided. What constitutes a "meaningful
opportunity" and at what point it must be offered were left unclear.
Furthermore, for juveniles who have committed homicide, this opin-
ion has no effect whatsoever. It is the novelty of the reasoning and
outcome, not the immediate consequence of the holding itself, that
makes Graham a turning point in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Most important among the new lines crossed by Graham was that
"'bright line' between the punishment of death and the various other
permutations and commutations of punishments short of that ultimate
sanction." 169 Graham is the first Supreme Court case to categorically
exclude a population from a specific punishment other than death. 170
Before Graham, categorical bans of this type had been premised on
the fact that death is the severest of punishments-utterly irrevocable
and unique in kind-and it should be reserved only for the worst of
criminals. 171 Thus, the lesser culpability of the mentally retardedl 72 or
juveniles,173 as compared to other convicted criminals, could justify a
categorical ban, but only because death was at stake. By breaking the
death barrier, Graham opens the possibility of categorically protecting
167. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
168. Id. at 2030 (majority opinion).
169. Rummel. 445 U.S. at 275.
170. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
171. See id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining the standard for "categorical propor-
tionality rulings" before Graham).
172. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-21 (2002).
173. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-79 (2005).
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other "less culpable" populations from punishments beyond
execution.174
Rather than openly acknowledging its destruction of the death is
different doctrine, the majority in Graham endeavored to redefine
lines of demarcation in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as well as
clarify previously established and surviving ones. 75 Justice Kennedy
still seemed to be searching for the lacking "unifying principles"1 7 6 he
sought in an earlier case, where he had observed that "[t]he tension
between general rules and case-specific circumstances has produced
results not altogether satisfactory." 77
Instead of explaining that the majority was reversing precedent in
determining that categorical exceptions to a punishment were no
longer limited to capital cases, Justice Kennedy simply stated that the
previous cases using categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment
standards had happened to involve the death penalty. 178 "The present
case involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a cate-
gorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence." 7 9
Graham redefined Eighth Amendment proportionality jurispru-
dence not along the previous lines of capital versus noncapital cases,
but categorical versus individual challenges to punishments. Before
Graham, some of the controversy among the Justices involved
whether proportionality applied at all outside a death penalty case. 80
It seemed that outside capital punishment cases the proportionality
principle would survive, but on a very limited basis; there could only
be individual case-by-case analyses of challenges to term-of-years
sentences, and such challenges would very rarely succeed.'81 How-
ever, Graham clearly cemented the fact that not only does proportion-
174. While Robinson also provided some precedent for such categorical protections, Robinson
is distinguishable from Graham in key aspects. Robinson did not protect a category of people
(regardless of their crimes) from a specific penalty or range of penalties: Robinson simply did
not allow a state to criminalize the status of addiction. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667-68 (1962). Graham, on the other hand, protects a specified population from a specific pen-
alty regardless of the range of crimes for which they are convicted-so long as those crimes do
not include homicide. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
175. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021-23.
176. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008).
177. Id. at 436.
178. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
179. Id.
180. Compare Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (plurality opinion) (refusing to
extend proportionality review beyond death penalty cases), with Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 21 (2003) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that proportionality review could be used in cases
involving extreme sentences).
181. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21 (plurality opinion); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-1001 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
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ality apply outside the death penalty context, but also that such a
challenge to a sentence can be successful on a categorical basis.
Justice Kennedy outlined two separate forms of analysis for individ-
ual versus categorical challenges to sentences.182 There has been criti-
cism of Graham's divide between individual and categorical
protection calling the distinction "more semantic than substantive" 8 3
and questioning whether the "two different modes of analysis are
necessary."1 84
While this criticism is correct in that the distinction may not always
affect a case's outcome, there are circumstances in which the conse-
quences of the distinction could be substantial. This is because, unlike
individual tests that require comparison of the details of a specific
crime to a specific sentence to determine proportionality (and only if
the sentence appears grossly disproportional does a court look to
other people's sentences for the same type of crime), categorical tests
do not require consideration of all. the details of a particular crime in
determining proportionality. 8 5
This is reasonable because when developing a categorical rule, the
individual details of a specific crime (such as aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors) are not all relevant.186 For nature-of-offense categorical
rules, the type of crime tends to only matter in broad terms;'87 for
nature-of-offender categorical rules, the type of crime may not matter
at all-or may be described in extremely broad negative terms (as was
the case in Graham).18
It logically follows that a convict who has committed a particularly
horrific crime in terms of aggravating factors would probably fare bet-
ter under a categorical than an individual analysis because the aggra-
vating factors may become irrelevant. Conversely, a convict whose
182. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021-22.
183. Smith & Cohen, supra note 19, at 90.
184. Id. at 91.
185. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021-22.
186. See id. at 2022.
187. Examples of nature-of-offense categorical rules include Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407, 421 (2008) (prohibiting capital punishment for rape of a child); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 797 (1982) (prohibiting capital punishment for felony murder without proof of intent to
kill); and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-660 (1977) (prohibiting capital punishment for
rape). Some nature-of-offense categorical rules may be even more broad as to the type of crime
committed; for example, Kennedy's rule that, "[a]s it relates to crimes against individuals, . . . the
death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim's life was not taken." Ken-
nedy, 554 U.S. at 437.
188. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017-18, 2022. Nature-of-offender categorical rules include
"prohibiting the death penalty for defendants who committed their crimes before the age of 18,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), or [for defendants] whose intellectual functioning is in a
low range, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)." Id. at 2022 (citations omitted).
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crime has strong mitigating factors may fare better under an individ-
ual analysis that takes into account specific details surrounding the
crime.189
For categorical challenges, Graham outlined the following
approach:
The Court first considers objective indicia of society's standards, as
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine
whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing prac-
tice at issue. Next, guided by the standards elaborated by control-
ling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning,
and purpose, the Court must determine in the exercise of its own
independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates
the Constitution.190
These elements of analysis are familiar from previous cases apply-
ing a categorical proportionality challenge to death penalty cases.19'
It is in essence a two-step analysis involving (1) national consensus
and (2) the Court's independent judgment. The Court's analysis
seems to imply that one without the other cannot stand. In examining
how the Court applied these principles, however, there were surprises
beyond the breaking of the death barrier.
B. Application of the New Rules to Graham with a Few Surprises
1. National Consensus Versus the Court's Independent Judgment
The first surprise in Graham's application of law concerned national
consensus; Graham represents the first Supreme Court case to find
national consensus when an actual minority of the fifty states' legisla-
tion supported the judgment.192 At the time Graham was heard,
thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and federal law all per-
mitted a life-without-parole sentence for juvenile, nonhomicide of-
fenders.193 The case did not reject previous precedent claiming that
the country's legislatures' enactments provide "[t]he clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."194 But the ma-
jority, following the example of several previous cases, refused to be
189. Therefore, now that the death penalty no longer determines what type of analysis is
available, an interesting outcome of Graham may be that litigants try to frame their Eighth
Amendment challenges as categorical or individual depending on which form of analysis they
think more likely to succeed.
190. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
192. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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limited to that measure.195 It justified finding national consensus
through "an examination of actual sentencing practices in jurisdictions
where the sentence . . . is permitted by statute."196 The Court took
into consideration that only 123 juveniles were then serving life-
without-parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses in 11
jurisdictions. 97
Acknowledging the departure of this case from previous standards
of national consensus "in terms of absolute numbers," the Court fur-
ther justified its finding of national consensus by pointing out the rela-
tively small proportion of life-without-parole sentences given to
juveniles in comparison with the opportunities for its imposition.198
Graham's majority attempted no response to Justice Thomas's criti-
cism that perhaps the fact "[t]hat a punishment is rarely imposed dem-
onstrates nothing more than a general consensus that it should be just
that-rarely imposed. It is not proof that the punishment is one the
Nation abhors."199
The second surprise in Graham was the assertion that national con-
sensus is not always necessary to a successful proportionality chal-
lenge. Although there were also implications in Graham to the
contrary, 200 the majority stated, "[a] sentence lacking any legitimate
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the of-
fense." 201 In doing so, it suggested a scenario in which national con-
sensus could be irrelevant to the Court's independent judgment. In
fact, given the weak evidence of national consensus, Graham may be
that very case.
Earlier cases seemed to subordinate the Court's independent judg-
ment to the finding of national consensus. The Court's independent
judgment had simply "bolstered the Court's confidence that the objec-
tive evidence in that case did, in fact, herald the emergence of a genu-
ine national consensus."202 But Graham does the opposite-national
consensus is an important but nondecisive factor within the Court's
analysis. "Community consensus," the Court explained, "while enti-
tled to great weight, is not itself determinative of whether a punish-
ment is cruel and unusual. In accordance with constitutional design,
195. Id. at 2023-26; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
196. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
197. Id. at 2015-16.
198. Id. at 2025.
199. Id. at 2051 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
201. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
202. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 598 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining her
view of the Atkins majority, which she had joined).
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the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsi-
bility." 203 Still, the Court has never found a punishment cruel and
unusual without also determining there was national consensus-even
if on weak evidence.
2. The Factors in the Court's Independent Judgment
In fulfilling its independent, interpretive role, the Court considered
(1) "the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question"
and (2) "whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate
penological goals."204 The following discussion turns to Graham's as-
sessment of these factors.
a. Degrees of Culpability
Unsurprisingly, Graham relied on Roper to find that juveniles were
less culpable for crimes than adults and on Kennedy v. Louisiana to
establish less culpability for those who commit nonhomicide of-
fenses.205 The Court explained, "[W]hen compared to an adult mur-
derer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice
diminished moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature
of the crime each bear on the analysis." 206
Graham accepted Roper's three bases for diminished juvenile cul-
pability without change: immaturity and irresponsibility; increased
vulnerability to outside influences, such as peer pressure; and a char-
acter more likely to be reformed. 207 Before Graham was decided,
scholars argued over whether, and to what extent, the Court should
consider the neuroscientific and psychological research presented by
the defense attorneys. 208 On this subject the Court stated:
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court's observa-
tions in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner's amici
point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue
to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.
For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control con-
tinue to mature through late adolescence. Juveniles are more capa-
203. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2027; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) ("As it relates to
crimes against individuals, . . . the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the
victim's life was not taken.").
206. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
207. Id. at 2026-27.
208. See, e.g., Johanna Cooper Jennings, Juvenile Justice, Sullivan, and Graham: How the Su-




ble of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be
evidence of "irretrievably depraved character" than are the actions
of adults. 209
Thus, the Court took a middle-of-the-road approach. The neuros-
cience and psychology arguments were deemed worthy of considera-
tion.210 The Court considered that evidence but only relied on it
insofar as to decide to confidently follow its own precedents on the
subject. 211
b. The Severity of the Sentence
After finishing the moral proportionality analysis of culpability, the
Court turned to the severity of the sentence. It concluded that outside
the death penalty, life-without-parole is the severest sentence availa-
ble to courts and is especially harsh for juveniles who face many more
potential years in prison than significantly older inmates facing the
same sentence. 2 1 2 It also shares certain unique qualities with the
death penalty in terms of the punishment's rejection of any hope for
the convict to reenter society. 213
c. The Valid Purposes of Punishment
Next, addressing the valid purposes for punishment-retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-the Court concluded
that no penological theory was adequate to justify life-without-parole
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. 2 14 As discussed earlier,
this holding alone could be sufficient to create a categorical ban of the
punishment. 2 1 5 The degree-of-culpability issue was a key factor in dis-
missing each penological justification for the sentence.
The Court rejected retribution because the right to condemn the
crime and "seek restoration of . . . moral imbalance" 2 1 6 could not out-
weigh "[t]he heart of the retribution rationale," which states that "a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the . . . culpability of the
criminal offender."217 The juvenile's diminished culpability, as com-
pared to adults, prevailed over the need "to express the community's




212. Id. at 2027-28.
213. See id. at 2027-30.
214. Id. at 2028-30.
215. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 ("A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification
is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.").
216. Id.
217. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
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. .. outrage or . . . attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the
victim." 218
Deterrence could not justify the sentence because "the same char-
acteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest ...
that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence." 2 1 9 "Even if the
punishment has some connection to a valid penological goal, it must
be shown that the punishment is not grossly disproportionate in light
of the justification offered." 220 The Court concluded that "any limited
deterrent effect" was outweighed by the "juvenile nonhomicide of-
fenders' diminished moral responsibility." 2 2 1
Incapacitation was likewise insufficient to justify a life-without-
parole sentence. The Court admitted that recidivism poses a serious
danger for society, but still found incapacitation inadequate to justify
life-without-parole for juveniles who had not committed homicide. 2 2 2
Although the Court did not explicitly say this was linked to a lack of
culpability, it did explicitly link its finding to factors it had considered
in determining juveniles are less culpable; namely, a juvenile's capac-
ity to change and the difficulty in determining which juveniles are ir-
reparably corrupt and which are subject only to "transient
immaturity." 223 The severe sentence at issue "improperly denies the
juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity."224
The Court seemed to acknowledge this penological purpose was the
closest to being valid when it said, "Incapacitation cannot override all
other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment's rule against dis-
proportionate sentences be a nullity."2 25
And finally, rehabilitation was irrelevant because a life-without-
parole sentence allows for no goal to return the inmate to society.
Furthermore, the implied judgment that such an inmate's character is
irredeemable "is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide
offender's capacity for change and limited moral culpability. . . . For
juvenile offenders, who are most in need of and receptive to rehabili-
tation, the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes
the disproportionality of the sentence all the more evident." 2 2 6
218. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)).
219. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571).
220. Id.





226. Id. at 2030 (citation omitted).
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Thus, each penological goal was found to be invalid, with the core
reason being that juveniles who have not committed homicide are
generally less culpable than others who commit the same crimes.
However, there was no claim that the same goals could be valid for a
sentence less severe than life-without-parole, and at times the reason-
ing specifically relied on the unique nature of life-without-parole in
never giving a juvenile the chance to reenter society.
Because the Court had earlier stated that a sentence is inherently
disproportionate when there was no valid penological purpose, 227 its
rejection of each penological justification was on its own sufficient to
uphold the judgment. But the Court did not say so explicitly. Instead,
it said that its consideration of this factor, along with its consideration
of the level of culpability and the severity of sentence, led to a conclu-
sion that the punishment is cruel and unusual for juvenile nonhomi-
cide offenders. 228 Interestingly, there was no link at this point in the
opinion back to national consensus. The Court's independent judg-
ment seemed to be sufficient to sustain the judgment.
3. When Categorical Rules Are Appropriate Rather than a Case-by-
Case Analysis
In the following section of Graham, the Court expounded on the
reasons a categorical rule in this case was justified, rather than taking
a case-by-case analysis. This was a clear response to Chief Justice
Roberts's concurrence, which called for the opposite approach.229
The Court's lengthy discussion can be reduced to three main points.
First, the risk was too great that a judge or jury would not be able to
accurately determine those juveniles who were insufficiently culpable
and who had capacity for change. It was too likely "that the brutality
or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower miti-
gating arguments based on youth."230 Given the "marked and well
understood" differences between juveniles and adults, the Court
would not allow for this risk. 231
Second, the Court pointed to "special difficulties encountered by
counsel in juvenile representation." 2 32 Some of the same factors that
led the Court to determine juveniles are not as culpable as adults con-
227. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 ("A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification
is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.").
228. Id. at 2030.
229. See id. at 2036-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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tributed to problems with juvenile representation: their limited under-
standing of relevant institutions and proceedings; their immaturity;
their "[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a correspond-
ing impulsiveness; and [their] reluctance to trust defense counsel seen
as part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to
poor decisions." 233 A categorical rule was seen as protecting youth
who might otherwise be wrongfully sentenced to life-without-parole
only because of these problems with representation.
Third and finally, the categorical rule would protect opportunities
for a whole list of potentially positive outcomes, including "maturity
and reform"; "remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation"; and "self-
recognition of human worth and potential." 234 The Court lamented
the lack of services and education in prisons for those ineligible for
parole. It aimed to "avoid[] the perverse consequence in which the
lack of maturity that led to an offender's crime is reinforced by the
prison term." 235
Justice Kennedy's opinion was without question the first of its kind
in multiple respects. The death barrier was broken, the categorical
cases redefined, and the national consensus requirement appeared to
be no longer strictly required. Although the Court made an effort to
find national consensus in this case, the rather unconvincing attempt
and the independent holding greatly diminished its importance, de-
spite language regarding its "great weight." 236 But contrary to Justice
Thomas's criticisms, there were limiting principles established;
namely, those regarding determination of culpability, validity of pun-
ishment, and circumstances that warrant categorical rules. The next
Part applies these limiting principles to a different but logically de-
serving group.
IV. GRAHAM IMPLICITLY PROHIBITS ABOLISHMENT OF THE
INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Relevant Definitions of the Severely Mentally Ill and the
Insanity Defense
Before applying the principles of Graham to show why they logi-
cally prohibit abolishment of the insanity defense, this Article must
define what it means by the notoriously nebulous terms of the "se-
verely mentally ill" and the "insanity defense."
233. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2033.
236. Id. at 2026 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)).
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1. The Severely Mentally Ill
Mental illness can vary widely in form and severity. The National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) estimates that in any given year
one quarter of adults living in the United States.are diagnosable for
one or more mental disorders. 237 However, the main societal costs
come from a much smaller but significant population suffering from
seriously debilitating mental illness-approximately 6% of adults (1 in
17) in the United States.238 The statistics are significantly higher for
children-the U.S. Surgeon General estimates that 1 in 10 children
live with a serious mental or emotional disorder. 239 The most recent
studies released from the U.S. Department of Justice support the con-
tention that prisons have become this country's primary national
mental health facilities-with 56% of state prisoners, 45% of federal
prisoners, and 64% of jail prisoners suffering from mental illness.240
U.S. jails and prisons "hous[e] well over 350,000 inmates with serious
mental illness compared to approximately 70,000 patients with serious
mental illness in hospitals." 241
The problem with all these common references to serious or severe
mental illness is that not all reputable organizations or studies define
the category in the same manner. Some may define severe mental
illness as including only schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or severe de-
pression;242 while another expands the group to include various other
disorders;243 and yet another may base the definition on a more be-
havioral, impairment, or time-frame basis.244
Even in areas where a group of the severely mentally ill is more
specifically defined, there is ambiguity. For example, researchers
seem to agree that approximately one percent of the global and U.S.
populations suffer from schizophrenia, one of the severest forms of
237. Any Disorder Among Adults, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (NIMH), http://www.nimh.
nih.gov/statistics/1ANYDISADULT.shtml (last visited June 20, 2011).
238. Id.
239. Mental Illness: Facts and Numbers, supra note 3.
240. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 3, at 1, 4.
241. State Advocacy, NAMI, http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=stateAdvocacy&
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=93161 (last visited Oct. 3,
2011). -
242. See id.
243. See What Is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, NAMI, http://www.nami.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/InformYourself/AboutMentalIllness/About_Mental_Illness.htm (last vis-
ited June 20, 2011).
244. See Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among U.S. Adults by Age, Sex, and Race,
NIMH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/SMIAASR.shtml (last visited June 20, 2011) (relying
on the National Survey on Drug Use and Health's definition of a serious mental illness).
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mental illness.245 Such studies agree the proportion of population is
consistent across ethnic groups, but also acknowledge that
"[s]chizophrenia is an incredibly complex disorder that has increas-
ingly been recognized as a collection of different disorders. It has also
increasingly been viewed from a developmental perspective, with full
psychosis representing a late stage of the disorder . . . ."246 There may
come a time when doctors will be able to diagnose and differentiate
among different types and stages of brain disease through techniques
such as brain image scans or blood tests.2 4 7 Although scientists are
already able to study fascinating differences between sample studies
of healthy and schizophrenic populations, medical science is not
yet able to make consistently reliable diagnoses through such
processes. 248
In the meantime the diseases causing mental illness are diagnosed
based on their outward manifestations. For example, schizophrenics
may experience symptoms such as severe and disabling deficits in
thought processes, perceptions, and emotional responsiveness; delu-
sions; hallucinations; hearing voices; a belief that others are plotting to
harm them; difficulty distinguishing reality from fantasy; disorganized
thoughts; poor ability to understand information or use it to make de-
cisions; poor working memory; trouble focusing; speaking little or
confused speech; reduced ability to begin and sustain planned activi-
ties; movement disorders; and flat expressions.24 9 But schizophrenia is
not diagnosed by any one determinative symptom, nor need a patient
have any certain combination of them; all of its symptoms may also be
245. See, e.g., Schizophrenia, NIMH, http.//www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizo
phrenia/complete-index.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) ("About 1 percent of Americans have
this illness.").
246. Schizophrenia, NIMH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/1SCHIZ.shtml (last visited
June 20, 2011).
247. See NIMH, NEUROlMAGING AND MENTAL ILLNESS: A WINDOW INTO THE BRAIN 2, 5,
available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/neuroimaging-and-mental-illness-a-
window-into-the-brain/neuroimaging-and-mental-illness-a-window-into-the-brain.shtml; Schizo-
phrenia, BRAIN & BEHAv. RESEARCH FOUND., http://bbrfoundation.org/schizophrenia (last vis-
ited Sept. 29, 2011); Schizophrenia Overview: Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://
health.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/schizophrenia/diagnosis.html.
248. See, e.g., Douglas Fox, The Insanity Virus, DISCOVER (Nov. 8, 2010), htip://discover
magazine.com/2010/j un/03-the-insanity-virus/?searchterm=insanity%20virus; What Causes Schiz-
ophrenia?, NIMH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizophrenialwhat-causes-schiz
ophrenia.shtml (last visited June 20, 2011).
249. See Schizophrenia, NAMI, http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By Illness&
Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=54,&ContentlD=23036 (last visited




part of other diseases.250 Diagnoses are made over a period of time
looking at the trajectory of the symptoms involved and taking into
account the symptoms' periodic manifestation and dormancy.251
Schizophrenia generally first becomes evident between adolescence
and early adulthood, though the age range can vary quite widely.252
Due to loss of rational capacities, many patients attempt to avoid any
diagnosis-"the majority of those living with schizophrenia do not be-
lieve themselves to be ill."253 Some doctors are also hesitant to pro-
vide a diagnosis (because of the associated stigma) or treatment
(because of legal constraints when a patient is unwilling). 254 All the
causes are not yet understood, but like other diseases, schizophrenia
seems to be caused by a combination of "genetic vulnerability and
environmental factors." 255 It has been tentatively associated with in-
fection or malnutrition before or at birth, as well as with gene mal-
function in producing important brain chemicals. 256 "The World
Health Organization has identified schizophrenia as one of the ten
most debilitating diseases affecting human beings," 257 but it is cer-
tainly not among the ten best understood.
Perhaps due in part to this ambiguity surrounding severe mental
illness in the medical world, the law has not turned to any specific
diagnosis in determining insanity. There is an understanding in the
medical world that mental illness rests on a vast continuum with some
only moderately affected, others completely losing capacity for ra-
tional thought or behavior, and many falling at every step between the
extremes.258 The legal world has not yet achieved a sufficiently
250. See Schizophrenia Overview: Diagnosis, supra note 247.
251. See Symptoms, Causes and Diagnosis, NAMI, http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?
Section=Schizophrenia9&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=11
7959 (last visited Sept. 29, 2011); Schizophrenia: Overview Diagnosis, supra note 247.
252. Schizophrenia Overview: Risk Factors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://health.ny-
times.com/health/guides/disease/schizophrenia/risk-factors.html.
253. What Is Schizophrenia?, NAMI, http://www.nami.org/Template.cfrn?Section=schizo
phrenia9 (last visited Sept. 29, 2011); see also PETE EARLEY, CRAZY: A FATHER'S SEARCH
THROUGH AMERICA'S MENTAL HEALTH MADNESS 13-16 (2006).
254. See, e.g., EARLEY, supra note 253, at 13-16; Diagnosing Schizophrenia, PUB. HEALTH
AGENCY CAN., http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/mh-sm/pubs/schizophrenia-schizophrenie/chpt05-eng.
php (last visited Sept. 29, 2011) ("Most doctors, well aware of the stigma that surrounds this
illness, don't like to voice their suspicions until they are sure that this diagnosis is correct.").
255. See Schizophrenia, supra note 249.
256. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
257. See Schizophrenia, supra note 249.
258. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & Hum. SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 4 (1999) available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/
chapterl/secl.html ("'[M]ental health' and 'mental illness' are not polar opposites but may be
thought of a points on a continuum.").
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graded system of responsibility to account for that continuum.259 The
focus of this Article is on those whose severe mental illness is suffi-
cient to meet an extreme form of the traditional insanity defenses em-
ployed in the vast majority of states. While recognizing that this
definition falls far short of capturing all forms of mental illness that
deserve increased protections under the law,2 6 0 this Article focuses on
protecting insanity defenses from obliteration. To complete the defi-
nition, the following discussion turns to those insanity defenses.
2. Insanity Defenses in the United States
Insanity defenses garner far more publicity than their frequency
alone would suggest. These defenses are raised in less than one per-
cent of felony cases and find success in only a fraction of those. 261 A
traditional insanity defense absolves the defendant of all criminal re-
sponsibility.262 This, of course, does not mean a violent and danger-
ous insane person is then allowed to walk free. It would generally be
necessary to civilly commit such a person, both to protect society and
to administer treatment to the sick individual. Although freedom is
restrained in both criminal incarceration and civil commitment to a
hospital, civil commitment is not simply imprisonment by another
name. There are vital interests at stake for the severely mentally ill
individual. When there is a criminal conviction, the chances of receiv-
ing needed treatment in a prison facility are slim, and the environment
tends to exacerbate mental illness. A 2010 submission to the United
Nations reporting on treatment of mentally ill prisoners in the United
States found that
[t]reatment for mental illness in prison is extremely limited and,
inmates often do not receive treatment at all, despite reporting sui-
cidal thoughts, self-injury, and paranoia. When provided, it often
consists of brief psychologist visits to cell-fronts or the provision of
psychotropic medication....
. . . [O]nly one-third of U.S. prisoners categorized as having a
mental health condition are given any treatment while in prison. In-
stead, prison officials frequently segregate mentally ill inmates in-
259. See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 189, 211 (1999).
260. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Bard, Re-arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarcera-
tion of Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and Constitutional
Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the Insanity Defense, 5
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & Pot'Y 1, 5 (2005) ("Most individuals affected by some degree of mental
illness are excluded from insanity defense consideration because the inquiry is limited to the
narrow issue of whether a person can be excused from all responsibility due to mental illness.").
261. Insanity Defense FA Qs, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/triall
faqs.html (last visited June 22, 2011).
262. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 133 (2011).
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cluding in solitary confinement, on the basis that their mental illness
prevents them from conforming to prison rules or leads them to act
out. A federal court determined that half of the mentally ill inmates
in one state were living in the segregation units of their prisons. In-
mates with serious mental illnesses are often haphazardly released
into the community without having received needed treatment,
making them likely to recidivate. Such practices effectively penalize
the mentally ill for their illness . . . .263
These grave health concerns are not the only implications of a crim-
inal conviction. A severely mentally ill person who does not qualify
for a traditional insanity defense may face the death penalty (so long
as not deemed insane at the moment of execution) or any other sen-
tence applicable to the crime committed. 264 If released after serving
time in prison, a mentally ill individual faces huge hurdles not only in
terms of finding treatment to manage the disease, but also in carrying
a criminal record and the stigma that it entails.
The idea that insane individuals should not face such criminal con-
sequences has its origins in antiquity-Muslim, Hebraic, and Roman
law all recognized the doctrine in some form.2 6 5 For centuries Anglo-
American legal societies have recognized that someone deprived of
rational capacity should not face criminal consequences. In a 1724
English case, Rex v. Arnold, the jury was instructed
to acquit by reason of insanity where the defendant was "a mad
man," that is, "a man that is totally deprived of his understanding
and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than a
brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of
punishment. "266
This has come to be known as the "wild beast test" and has been criti-
cized for its emphasis on total depravity-leaving no protection for
those influenced by lesser degrees of severe mental illness. 2 6 7
But the most influential English case on present American insanity
laws occurred in the following century. In 1843, Daniel M'Naghten
shot and killed the Prime Minister's secretary, Edward Drummond.268
263. CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH ET AL., CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUS-
TICE 5-6 (2010), available at http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session9/USIUSH
RNUPRUSA_S09_2010_Annex4_Criminal%2OJustice%2OJoint%2OReport%20USA.pdf
(footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (plurality opinion).
265. Andrew P. March, Note, Insanity in Alaska, 98 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1492-93 (2010).
266. Russell D. Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1375, 1398 (2009) (quoting MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 75 (1994)).
267. Id. at 1398 n.113.
268. March, supra note 265, at 1493 (citing M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718 (H.L.)).
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M'Naghten had mistaken Drummond for Prime Minister Robert Peel,
who he believed was part of a conspiracy against him.269 Because of
M'Naghten's delusions, he was found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. 270 The public outcry over this verdict, influenced also by an
attempt on the Queen's life by another person acquitted for insanity,
prompted the House of Lords' request that judges verify the legal
standard of insanity.271 The result is what has come to be known as
the M'Naghten test:
[T]o establish a defence on the grounds of insanity, it must be con-
clusively proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from the
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.272
This is also commonly referred to as the "right-wrong" or the cogni-
tive test because it focuses on the ability of defendants to understand
the nature of their own actions or understand that those actions are
legally or morally wrong.273
The M'Naghten test, however, garnered criticism because it did not
consider whether defendants could control their actions, regardless of
any moral awareness. 274 Some jurisdictions thus added to M'Naghten
a control, or "irresistible impulse," test 2 75 whereby a defendant is also
acquitted if, "as a result of mental disorder, the defendant was unable
at the time of the crime to control his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of the law." 2 7 6
The most lenient form of an insanity defense to take root in the
United States was known as the "product test," or Durham rule, get-
ting its name from a 1950s D.C. Circuit case. 2 7 7 The court rejected
both the cognitive and control tests, holding "that an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental




272. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722).
273. See Brian D. Shannon, Essay, The Time Is Right to Revise the Texas Insanity Defense. 39
TEX. TECH. L. REv. 67, 71, 74 (2006).
274. See id. at 72.
275. See, e.g., id.
276. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092.
277. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Durham court, however, gave credit to
New Hampshire as being the first to articulate a similar rule. Id., 214 F.2d at 874 (citing State v.
Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870)).
278. Id. at 874-75.
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control tests as inadequate because they require that the defendant
"display[] particular symptoms that medical science has long recog-
nized do not necessarily, or even typically, accompany even the most
serious mental disorder." 279 A severely mentally ill defendant may
have some understanding that an action is criminal; the action may
even "be coolly and carefully prepared; yet it is still the act of a
madman." 280
In the eighteen years before Durham was overturned, 281 only Maine
adopted the case's insanity test. 282 But despite this apparent failure to
influence the nation's approach to legal insanity, Durham had wide-
spread influence in prompting national debate on the topic. At least
one commentator has credited Durham's influence with "paving the
way for many jurisdictions' adoption of the reform-oriented insanity
standard proposed by the American Law Institute [ALI]." 28 3 The
ALI's Model Penal Code presented an insanity test that included both
a cognitive and control prong but allowed for a defendant suffering
from mental disease to "lack[ ] substantial capacity" to appreciate
conduct as wrong or to conform conduct to the law.284 This softened
the "all-or-none, bright-line language [of] standard insanity rules." 285
Prior to 1979, all fifty states had an insanity defense. 286 By 1982,
when John Hinckley successfully used the insanity defense to escape
conviction for his attempted assassination of President Ronald Rea-
gan, most states and all but one federal circuit had adopted the Model
Penal Code test.2 87
Hinckley's attempt to assassinate Reagan had been captured on
film and was repeatedly replayed on national television along with de-
279. Id. at 876.
280. Id. at 873.
281. See Brawner, 471 F.2d. at 981.
282. Covey, supra note 266, at 1410. Maine no longer employs the Durham test. Instead, it
uses a modified version of the Model Penal Code test. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39
(1964). New Hampshire is now the only state to use the Durham test for insanity. See State v.
Labranche, 942 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (N.H. 2008).
283. Covey, supra note 266, at 1410.
284. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("(1) A person is not respon-
sible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental
disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise anti-social conduct.").
285. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092.
286. Daniel J. Nusbaum, Note, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of the
Constitutional Implications of "Abolishing" the Insanity Defense, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1509. 1518
(2002).
287. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092.
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tails regarding the would-be killer's motive to impress movie star Jodi
Foster.28 8 His acquittal caused public outrage and swift political con-
sequences. 289 Hinckley had been acquitted under the Model Penal
Code test, and many states reverted from that test to the purely cogni-
tive M'Naghten test.290 Congress also did so, passing the Insanity De-
fense Reform Act of 1984, which established the first uniform test in
federal trials291 and is a variation of the M'Naghten test.2 9 2 Congress
and many states also changed the burden of persuasion-instead of
the government having to show a person was not insane in a criminal
trial (once that issue was put reasonably in question), the defendant
would have to show insanity.293 In 1979, two years before the Hinck-
ley incident, Montana was the first state to abolish the insanity de-
fense,294 and in the post-Hinckley outrage four other states-Utah,
Kansas, Idaho, and Nevada-joined Montana in abolishing the de-
fense.295 Nevada's Supreme Court has since found the abolishment
unconstitutional, 296 while the supreme courts of four other states have
288. See Covey, supra note 266, at 1418; Jonny Dymond, Ronald Reagan: 30 Years Since As-
sassination Attempt, BBC NEws (Mar. 29, 2011, 8:49 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
us-canada-12901691 (containing ABC News footage of the assassination attempt); Biography:
John Hinckley, Jr., PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/biography/
reagan-hinckley (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
289. See Covey, supra note 266, at 1418-19.
290. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092.
291. Covey, supra note 266, at 1419; Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092: see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (2006).
292. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 17 (laying out the federal test), with M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 10
Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 722 (laying out the M'Naghten test). The federal test
provides that
[i]t is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time
of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a). The federal test also puts the burden on the defendant to prove insanity by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 17(b).
293. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092.
294. Covey, supra note 266, at 1419; Stephanie C. Stimpson, Note, State v. Cowan: The Conse-
quences of Montana's Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 55 MONT. L. REV. 503, 510 (1994) (ex-
plaining that the 1979 change made mental illness relevant only to the post-conviction phase of
criminal proceedings); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102. -103, -311, -312 (2011).
295. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092. Insanity legislation regarding options such as
"guilty but mentally ill," allowing for mitigation consideration in sentencing, or negating the
rnens rea element of the crime do not provide nearly the extent of protection provided by the
traditional insanity defenses. See, e.g., infra notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
296. Finger v. State. 27 P.3d 66, 84 (Nev: 2001).
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thus far upheld the abolishment despite constitutional challenges and
vehement dissents. 297
Thus, currently forty-six states have an insanity defense-and forty-
five of those have insanity tests based on some variant of the
M'Naghten or Model Penal Code tests. 2 98 States with the Model Pe-
nal Code test generally include a control element, and some states
using the M'Naghten test have added an "irresistible impulse" or con-
trol element, but no state has solely a control test.299 The burden-of-
proof requirements vary among the states, and only New Hampshire
retains the lenient product-of-mental-illness test.300
The Supreme Court has found no constitutional barrier to requiring
defendants to prove that they are insane beyond a reasonable doubt
rather than requiring the state to carry that burden.301 Nor has the
Supreme Court found a due process concern with a M'Naghten test
that focuses solely on whether the defendant could distinguish be-
tween right and wrong, while eliminating the prong regarding under-
standing the nature of one's acts.302 The Court has examined the
varied standards for determining insanity among the states and has
concluded "that no particular formulation has evolved into a baseline
for due process . . . . [The] insanity rule, like the conceptualization of
criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice."30 3 But the
Court has never considered or ruled on whether abolishment of the
defense is constitutional. 304 The words "substantially open to state
choice" suggest states are not completely free to abolish it.
It is true there are significant differences among the details of the
insanity tests currently employed in this country, but the core princi-
ples are the same-each test attempts to evaluate whether a defen-
297. See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003);
State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995); see also
Korell, 690 P.2d at 1007 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) ("I do not hold with the majority that there is no
independent constitutional right to plead insanity. I consider that position the ultimate
insanity.").
298. The Insanity Defense Among the States, FINDLAw, http://criminal.findlaw.com/crimes/
more-criminal-topics/insanity-defense/the-insanity-defense-among-the-states.htm (last visited
Sept. 29, 2011).
299. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092; see also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-52
(2006); The Insanity Defense Among the States, supra note 298.
300. See The Insanity Defense Among the States, supra note 298 (noting New Hampshire's
retention of the Durham standard).
301. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952).
302. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 748, 756.
303. Id. at 752. The portion of this Article discussing national consensus takes issue with the
underlying reasoning of the statement that no fundamental baseline for an insanity defense has
evolved. See infra notes 307-26 and accompanying text.
304. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1092.
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dant was so mentally deranged at the time of the act in question that
he or she lacked mental capacity to obey the law and should not be
held legally responsible for that action.305 For ease of discussion, the
terms "severely mentally ill" and "insane," as used in the remainder of
this Article, will incorporate people unable to (1) understand the
wrongfulness of their actions, (2) understand the nature or quality of
their acts, or (3) conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.
In essence, this Article argues this is a constitutional minimum for
state-defined insanity defenses.
States are and should be free to experiment with protections above
and beyond this minimum. This Article acknowledges that the consti-
tutional minimum definition is far too restrained in terms of discussing
who should be protected under our laws due to their lack of rational
capacity.306 And there are certainly many of the severest mentally ill
people who would not qualify for this legally defined insanity test.
This Article focuses on a constitutional minimum and not on the ideal
definition of an insanity defense. It focuses on those who should be
protected as the law currently stands and not on how laws and policies
should be changed and developed.
B. Graham Logically Prohibits Abolishment of the
Insanity Defense
1. National Consensus Favors Insanity Defenses
For categorical challenges the Court in Graham acknowledged that
it must "consider[ ] 'objective indicia of society's standards, as ex-
pressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine
whether there is national consensus against the sentencing practice at
issue."307 The insanity defense does not even require the increasingly
relaxed standards of Atkins, Roper, and Graham to cross this hurdle.
While Atkins and Roper counted 30 states on their side in terms of
supporting legislation and Graham counted a paltry 13,308 46 states
and the federal government have an independent insanity defense.309
Thus, relying on state legislation alone, which the Supreme Court has
recognized as "[t]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
305. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 372 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, Associate C.J., dissenting).
306. See Bard, supra note 260, at 5 (arguing that there is a "moral obligation to consider the
whole range of mental illness in assessing criminal responsibility").
307. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 572 (2005)).
308. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).




contemporary values,"310 there is plainly national consensus that some
form of a complete insanity defense is required.
Although some cases have tried to diminish the appearance of a
national consensus in a due process context by highlighting the differ-
ences between the insanity defenses among the states,31' the similari-
ties are far more striking. Clark v. Arizona pointed out that there are
four major strains in insanity defenses: cognitive incapacity (under-
standing the nature and quality of one's actions), moral incapacity
(understanding the difference between right and wrong), volitional in-
capacity (the ability to control one's actions), and the product-of-
mental-illness tests.312
What Clark failed to emphasize was how two of these four strains
are common to all of the traditional forms of the insanity defense and
how the strains can overlap conceptually. For example, 45 of the 46
states with an insanity defense employ some form of the M'Naghten or
Model Penal Code test-both of these tests incorporate protections
regarding moral incapacity, although there is a difference in the de-
gree of incapacity required by the two tests.313 Both tests also require
that the action be the product of a mental disease. Thus any person
able to show lack of moral capacity because of mental disease will
pass all the traditional forms of the insanity tests-whether it is the
Model Penal Code, M'Naghten, or the product-of-mental-illness (Dur-
ham) test.314
These similarities cannot be overshadowed by differences of who
carries the burden of proof, the availability of guilty-but-mentally-ill
verdicts, or the fact that some states add the additional protections
that if individuals cannot control or do not understand the nature and
quality of their actions there is no crime.315 The Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of keeping only the moral prong of the
M'Naghten test in part because the evidence regarding the defendant's
310. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).
311. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-53 (2006).
312. Id. at 749.
313. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), with March, supra
note 265, at 1493 (setting forth the M'Naghten test). Only one state has adopted solely the
cognitive prong of the M'Naghten test. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (2010).
314. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), with March, supra
note 265, at 1493 (setting forth the M'Naghten test), and Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862,
874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
315. Unlike the Model Penal Code test, the M'Naghten test does not have a volitional element
regarding control of one's actions unless a state has opted to add it. And unlike the M'Naghten
test, the Model Penal Code test does not incorporate a separate cognitive element regarding
understanding the nature and quality of one's actions apart from the moral strain. See supra
note 313 and accompanying text.
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understanding of his acts would still be relevant in deciding whether
the defendant understood the moral nature of his acts. 316 In other
words, the cognitive strain can be seen as a subset of the moral strain
in insanity tests.
Only one of the forty-five states using the Model Penal Code or
M'Naghten tests does not incorporate a moral strain-the require-
ment that defendants are able to understand the wrongfulness of their
actions to at least some degree. 317 These statistics suggest there does
seem to be broad consensus over the types of factors that should be
considered in determining insanity.318
A dissent from the Utah Supreme Court case that upheld abolishing
the defense summarized the issue well. Associate Chief Justice Stew-
art, with Justice Durham's support, explained that while clearly the
Federal Constitution does not mandate one specific form of the de-
fense, there is consensus across the states and across the centuries re-
garding key fundamental elements that cannot be abolished without
violating the Constitution.319
[T]he essence of the defense, however formulated, has been that a
defendant must have the mental capacity to know the nature of his
act and that it was wrong. Whether the test has been termed the
wild beast test, the M'Naghten test, the Durham test, the ALI test,
the federal test, or some other test, it has always had at its core the
proposition that those who are so mentally deranged as to lack the
mental capacity to comply with the law are not subject to punish-
ment under the criminal law for acts performed as a result of the
derangement. 320
Other factors considered by recent Supreme Court cases also sup-
port finding that there is a national consensus; for example, the pace
316. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 753-56.
317. See id. at 750-51; see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010.
318. See Trent Echard, Note, Clark v. Arizona: Has the Court Painted Itself into a Corner?, 1
PHOENIX L. REv. 213, 239 (2008) ("[O]ne might argue that a consideration of moral incapacity
in the judgment of guilt has risen to the level of a fundamental right because of the widespread
acceptance of moral incapacity defenses among the states. Further, because the Clark Court
asserted that cognitive incapacity is a subset of moral incapacity, one could argue that a consid-
eration of cognitive incapacity is also a fundamental right."). Furthermore, the Model Penal
Code test (used in some form by approximately 20 states) incorporates a volitional strain, and
several states using the M'Naghten test have added an "irresistible impulse" element to also
exempt those that cannot control their actions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962); The Insanity Defense Among the States, supra note 298. Although these num-
bers do not approach literal consensus among the states, they certainly dwarf the number of
states whose legislation was similar in Graham, where the Supreme Court still found national
consensus, albeit based in part on other factors. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023
(2010).




and consistency of legislation discussed in Atkins and Roper weigh in
favor of recognizing national consensus. 321 In subsequent decades no
state has joined the four that abolished the insanity defense in rela-
tively quick succession. Even under political pressure to abolish it, the
federal government resisted doing So. 3 2 2 Such resistance, coupled
with the "fact that anticrime legislation [was] far more popular than
legislation [protecting perpetrators]," is another factor weighing in
favor of national consensus, as first recognized by Atkins.323 Roper
and Graham both stand for the proposition that national consensus is
possible even where there exists expressly contrary legislation in a
much more significant number of states than are at issue with the in-
sanity defense.
It is also important to remember that the national consensus princi-
ple in determining constitutionality is a concession to the fact that the
definition of "cruel and unusual" may change over time. The reason
for incorporating the principle was to protect society against practices
that may have been acceptable at the time of the writing of the Consti-
tution, but are no longer palatable to modern society-the practice of
executing a seven-year-old being one example highlighted in Gra-
ham.3 2 4 However, the principle does not work in reverse. This author
has not located an instance where those practices that were consid-
ered cruel and unusual at the time the Constitution was penned have
been found to be no longer outlawed by the Constitution today due to
the hardening of current sympathies in the opposite direction. Thus,
the fact that insanity defenses had long been recognized in some re-
lated or recognizable form in Anglo-American jurisprudence at the
time the Constitution was created is also highly relevant in determin-
ing that abolishment of the defense results in cruel and unusual
punishment.
To quote arguably the most famous of originalists, Justice Scalia, it
is an "immemorial belief, here and in England" that whether an al-
leged criminal is truly insane "must rest upon circumstances duly to be
321. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
566 (2005).
322. See Herrera, 895 P.2d at 378 ("The abolition approach was proposed and rejected after
lengthy hearings in which numerous legal scholars, psychiatrists, and others testified, because
Congress 'felt that concerns about the dangers of an insanity defense were overstated and be-
cause abolition would alter that fundamental basis of Anglo-American criminal law: the existence
of moral culpability as a prerequisite for punishment."' (quoting United States v. Pohlot, 827
F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1987)).
323. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
324. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing
that "the Court wisely rejects [a] static approach to the law" that would "not rule out a death
sentence for a $50 theft by a 7-year-old").
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weighed and considered both by the judge and jury, lest on the one
side there be a kind of inhumanity towards the defects of human na-
ture, or on the other side too great an indulgence given to great
crimes." 325 Without an insanity defense, such considerations by a
judge or jury do not necessarily take place at all, for loss of rational
capacity that qualifies a defendant for an insanity defense is not gener-
ally relevant to the mental element in common law crimes.326
2. Factors Considered in the Court's Independent Judgment Require
an Insanity Defense: Is Proportional Punishment Possible
for the Legally Insane?
After national consensus, Graham requires the Court to "determine
in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punish-
ment in question violates the Constitution." 3 2 7 That consideration
should be "guided by the standards elaborated by controlling prece-
dents and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose." 328
a. Consideration of Culpability
When Graham considered the degree of culpability of juveniles and
the severity of the sentence at issue, it was just breaking down the
elements considered in proportionality. Culpability is defined by
Black's Law Dictionary as "[b]lameworthiness." 329 Proportionality
broadly requires that a defendant be sufficiently blameworthy to merit
whatever sentence is imposed. 330 Graham supports the proposition
that the punishment must fit not only the criminal act but also the
blameworthiness of the alleged criminal actor. The question here is
whether any punishment can be proportional for a person who com-
mitted an act while legally insane. By this Article's constitutional
minimum definition of insanity, a legally insane person, because of a
diseased mind, did not understand the nature of the act, the wrongful-
325. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting HALE, supra note 102, at 30).
326. See infra notes 363-64 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia's position subverts the ar-
gument that the potential of defendants to feign insanity or mental retardation should affect the
decision to give juries a free hand to make such judgment calls-for a jury is acclaimed as "the
best method of trial" possible for ascertaining facts. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 354 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting HALE, supra note 102, at 32-33).
327. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
328. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421
(2008)).
329. BLACK's LAw DicrIONARY 435 (9th ed. 2009).
330. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)




ness of the act, or was incapable of controlling the act in question.33'
In other words, under this definition a legally insane person is not
blameworthy, and any punishment therefore violates the principle of
proportionality. "One is a moral agent only if one is a rational
agent."332
This conclusion is abundantly clear when comparing the require-
ments of legal insanity to other contexts. It is for the very same rea-
sons that society generally shields infants and very young children
from any criminal responsibility. A two-year-old may purposely pick
up a gun, point it at a person, and shoot. A four-year-old may even
understand that the action will kill the person. But the law will not
generally hold these children accountable because the degree of
mental capacity is insufficient to warrant criminal blame. Similarly,
when an adult has so lost rational capacity as to qualify as insane
under the stringent threshold used by most states, there is no criminal
blameworthiness. Despite later arguments to the contrary, Robinson
was correct in explaining that loss of control (whether mental or phys-
ical) through no fault of an individual's own equates to loss of culpa-
bility and loss of any constitutional justification for punishment.333
This conclusion is also clear from the type of factors Supreme Court
cases have considered in determining levels of culpability. All of the
factors thus considered in Atkins, Roper, and Graham were attempt-
ing to measure the level of culpability by measuring the level of ra-
tional capacity and control. For example, Atkins justified outlawing
capital punishment for the mentally retarded because of diminished
capacity "in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their im-
pulses," which caused them "not [to] act with the level of moral culpa-
bility" of other adult criminals.334 Likewise, Roper and Graham
considered juveniles' "impetuous and ill-considered actions and deci-
sions" as products of an immature mind; their "less[er] control, or less
experience with control, over their own environment" and accompa-
nying increased susceptibility to peer pressure (presumably at least in
part because of their lesser ability to rationally reject bad suggestions
pushed by peers); and their character, which is more likely to be re-
331. This Article's "constitutional minimum definition" takes elements from the Model Penal
Code and M'Naghten tests used in some variation by the vast majority of states, but requires
more than substantial impairment.
332. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 390 (1995) (Durham, J., dissenting) (quoting MICHAEL S.
MooRE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 244 (1984)).
333. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 567 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
334. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
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formed than that of adults as the juveniles' brains mature.33 5 All these
factors are to some extent examining culpability through the lens of
rational capacity.
Atkins, Roper, and Graham were dealing in degrees of rational ca-
pacity and corresponding degrees of culpability. Legal insanity, by
contrast, examines loss of rational capacity so extreme as to result in
loss of culpability. Justice O'Connor recognized that the strongest
case for Eighth Amendment categorical protection exists where a
class of people is defined precisely by the characteristics that reduce,
or in the current context, eliminate culpability.336
b. Consideration of Valid Purposes of Punishment
In its independent analysis of Graham, the Court considered each
of the valid purposes of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapaci-
tation, and rehabilitation. Graham recognized that "[a] sentence lack-
ing any legitimate penological justification is by its nature
disproportionate to the offense" and thus unconstitutional. 337 The fol-
lowing further explains why the legally insane's lack of culpability un-
dermines every valid purpose for punishment.
First, retribution falls short because "[t]he heart of the retribution
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal offender."33  Where there is no
culpability, society loses entitlement to any form of criminal payment.
Punishing those who lack culpability would upset rather than restore
any moral imbalance.
Second, deterrence is irrelevant. People who are legally insane are,
by definition, incapable of rationally considering their actions and
possible consequences and appropriately conforming their actions
based on that reasoning. As Justice Douglas explained, "Nothing can
more strongly illustrate the popular ignorance respecting insanity than
the proposition, equally objectionable in its humanity and its logic,
that the insane should be punished for criminal acts in order to deter
other insane persons from doing the same thing." 339
Third and fourth, incapacitation and rehabilitation fail to justify
punishment of the insane. While it is important to protect society
335. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569-70 (2005).
336. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
337. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
338. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 149).
339. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting RAY,
supra note 34, at 56).
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from those whose sickness has caused violence or danger to others
and to promote the healing of diseased minds, both goals are better
served by civil commitment. John Hinckley was still in a psychiatric
ward nearly thirty years later. 340 There, he could get the medical help
that prevented further violence-help that is often completely absent
in the criminal prison system.341 Where an actor lacks culpability, the
incapacitation and rehabilitation theories cannot trump all, "lest the
Eighth Amendment's rule against disproportionate sentences be a
nullity."342
With no valid penal justification for sentences punishing the insane,
such sentences are inherently disproportionate and therefore uncon-
stitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, a state cannot
constitutionally abolish the insanity defense altogether. The national
consensus against abolishment of an insanity defense adds "great
weight" 343 to this finding under Graham, but is ultimately unnecessary
once it is determined that no valid penal justification exists.
3. Categorical Protection Is Necessary for the Insane
Finally, the Graham Court analyzed the situation in which categori-
cal protections are appropriate under the Eighth Amendment. The
legally insane clearly fall within the bounds of this analysis.
Without an insanity defense, the insane are vulnerable to being
found guilty of crimes even when lacking rational capacity and culpa-
bility because their actions and mental state will generally meet all the
common requirements of criminal law. Furthermore, when the mens
rea required for a crime is negligence or recklessness rather than in-
tent, an insane person will always be found guilty because these as-
sume comparison to the behavior of reasonable people-a showing
the insane cannot make by definition.
Even in cases where the insanity defense exists, there is always the
danger, as expressed in Graham, "that the brutality or cold-blooded
340. Lincoln Caplan, Op-Ed., The Insanity Defense, Post-Hinckley, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2011,
at A24. As this Article was being prepared for publication, hearings were held to determine if
"John Hinckley Jr. ha[d] progressed enough in his mental health treatment to live as an outpa-
tient with his mother in Williamsburg, Virginia ..... Jim Barnett, Hinckley Hearing to Resume
in January, CNN.com (Dec. 13, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-13/us/us hinckley-hear-
ing_1 hinckley-hearing-john-hinckley-thomas-delahanty?_.s=PM:US; see also Carol Cratty,
Hinckley Hearing Ends; Judge to Rule Later on Expanded Freedom, CNN.com (Feb. 9, 2012),
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-09/justice/justice-hinckley-hearingljohn-hinckley-hours-of-un-
accompanied-time-barry-levine?_s=PM:JUSTICE.
341. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
342. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. Graham only makes this comment regarding incapacita-
tion, but the logic naturally extends to rehabilitation as well.
343. Id. at 2026 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)).
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nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating argu-
ments ,"344 "despite insufficient culpability." 3 4 5 The press was full of
such concerns and debates regarding the potential trial of the man
accused in the attempted assassination of Representative Gabrielle
Giffords. 3 4 6
The "special difficulties" outlined in Graham, which often face
counsel in juvenile representation and justify a categorical approach
regarding juveniles, are yet more applicable to representation of the
severely mentally ill.347 These include "limited understanding[] of the
criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within
it"; decreased likelihood "to work effectively with their lawyers to aid
in their defense"; "[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences";
"impulsiveness"; and a "reluctance to trust defense counsel." 3 4 8 Add
to these further problems outlined by a 2010 American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) report on the mentally ill:
Prior to arrest, mentally ill defendants are more vulnerable to police
pressure and thus more likely to confess. Once charged with a capi-
tal crime, courts or juries routinely find that severely mentally ill
defendants, including capital defendants, meet the basic test of com-
petency. Delusional mentally ill defendants are more likely to insist
on representing themselves at trial, literally daring juries to sen-
tence them to death. Many mentally ill defendants are prone to
outbursts in front of their juries and some are so heavily medicated
that they appear to their juries devoid of any remorse. Juries fre-
quently reject insanity defenses in capital cases despite strong evi-
dence that the defendants were suffering from serious mental
illnesses at the time of the crime. As the United States Supreme
Court observed of those with mental retardation, mentally ill de-
fendants are "less able to give meaningful assistance to. their counsel
and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes." For
these reasons, juries are often scared into recommending a sentence
of death for mentally ill persons and fail to treat their mental illness
as the mitigating circumstance that it is. Mentally ill defendants
who have been sentenced to death often waive their appeals and
seek to volunteer for execution.
344. Id. at 2032.
345. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005)).
346. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, The Insanity Defense, SLATE (Jan. 11, 2011, 6:59 PM), http://
www.slate.com/id/2280694. As this Article was being prepared for publication, the perpetrator
in the Giffords case was found mentally incompetent to stand trial-at least for the present. See
Marc Lacey, Suspect Is Ruled Incompetent for Trial in Giffords Shooting, N.Y. TIMEs, May 26,
2011, at Al. But see Carol J. Williams, Judge Orders 4 More Months of Treatment for Tucson
Shooting Suspect, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/07/nation/la-na-
jared-loughner-20120207 (stating that he may soon be competent to stand trial).
347. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017.
348. Id. at 2032.
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Although constitutional law prohibits the execution of the men-
tally incompetent, the death sentences imposed on and executions
of numerous mentally ill people demonstrate that these laws are in-
sufficient safeguards for capital defendants with severe mental
impairments. 349
Facing this multitude of disadvantages in the criminal system, the
insane, like juveniles, need a categorical rule to avoid risking that, "as
a result of these difficulties, a court or jury will erroneously conclude"
that an insane person "is sufficiently culpable" for a criminal
sentence.350
And finally, like the juveniles in Graham, the mentally ill merit a
categorical rule to give offenders a chance to demonstrate reform, re-
newal, and rehabilitation, and to achieve "self-recognition of human
worth and potential." 351 While juveniles are a sympathetic case in this
arena because of their youth, immaturity, and increased tendency to
reform, the insane are a sympathetic case because of their lack of cul-
pability for their condition and actions, as well as their great likeli-
hood to reform with proper medication. In both cases, a prison can
"become[ ] complicit" in stopping potential healing or growth due to
the lack of necessary resources. 352
Thus, the factors considered by Graham in creating a categorical,
rather than a case-by-case, protection of juveniles under the Eighth
Amendment weigh equally or more heavily in favor of creating a simi-
lar categorical protection for the mentally ill. Having determined that
Graham logically requires finding abolishment of insanity defenses
unconstitutional, the following discussion turns to those states that
have abolished them and examines why their respective supreme
court analyses fail to justify any exception.
4. Overturning State Supreme Courts that Have Abolished the
Insanity Defense
Many of the holdings under previous challenges to the constitution-
ality of abolishment or manipulation of the insanity defense are some-
what irrelevant to our analysis here because those opinions generally
349. ACLU, SLAMMING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS: DENIAL OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND REM-
EDY IN AMERICA 11 (2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/HRPUPRsubmis-
sion.annex.pdf (footnotes omitted).
350. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 2032-33; see also supra note 263 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
resources in prisons for the mentally ill).
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focused on due process rather than Eighth Amendment concerns.353
As previously explained, the U.S. Supreme Court has never directly
considered whether abolishment of the defense is constitutional, so
any related reasoning to the subject is purely dicta. Although Su-
preme Court precedent suggests that states should have some freedom
in determining the boundaries of insanity defenses, never has there
been a majority of Justices suggesting that there can be no constitu-
tional minimum requirement in that sphere on Eighth Amendment
grounds. Indeed, even when the federal government was interested in
abolishing the defense after the attempted Reagan assassination, they
did not do so "because Congress felt that concerns about the dangers
of an insanity defense were overstated and because abolition would
alter that fundamental basis of Anglo-American criminal law: the ex-
istence of moral culpability as a prerequisite for punishment." 3 54
Of the five states that have abolished the insanity defense, only
Montana and Kansas originally relied on the Eighth Amendment in
upholding the constitutionality of abolishment. Idaho and Utah ini-
tially upheld constitutionality on other grounds without considering
whether punishing someone who was insane at the time of the crime is
cruel and unusual355 (although a strong dissent of two of the five Jus-
tices in the Utah opinion argued it was unconstitutional on those
grounds). 356 Nevada found the abolishment of the insanity defense
unconstitutional on due process grounds. 357 Kansas considered the
defendant's Eighth Amendment claim under Robinson. The court de-
cided, under the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant was
not suffering from severe mental illness when he gave a confession.358
Montana is therefore the only state that initially abolished the insanity
defense while giving substantial consideration to Eighth Amendment
concerns. Later state supreme court cases from places like Idaho and
Utah followed Montana's lead in also upholding the constitutionality
of abolishment under an Eighth Amendment analysis. Because these
later cases adopted similar reasoning to Montana's ground-breaking
353. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 756 (2006); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 919
(Idaho 1990); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 86 (Nev. 2001); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 385
(Utah 1995).
354. Herrera, 895 P.2d at 378 (Stewart, Associate C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
355. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 918-19; Herrera, 895 P.2d at 371 (majority opinion).
356. See Herrera, 895 P.2d at 372, 385-87 (Stewart, Associate C.J., dissenting).
357. Finger, 27 P.3d at 84.
358. See State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 456, 852-54 (Kan. 2003).
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case,359 We Will focus on why Montana's reasoning in Korrell is not in
line with Supreme Court precedent. 360
Montana argued its laws were in compliance with Robinson, in that
the Montana criminal code prohibited punishment of the insane if
they committed no criminal act. 361 As discussed at the beginning of
this Article, this is not enough to comply with that case, for Robinson
clearly also requires that defendants are able to have some control
over the conduct for which they are being punished. 362 Even under
Powell-the case whose plurality opinion tried to define Robinson in
the same fashion as Montana-a majority of Justices (when combining
the dissent and a concurrence) agreed that if defendants cannot con-
trol their actions through no fault of their own, they should not be
held criminally responsible. 363
Montana's argument that allowing a sentencing judge freedom to
put an insane individual in a mental hospital avoids cruel and unusual
punishment is absurd. 364 The sentencing judge by definition is deliver-
ing a sentence for a convicted crime. Criminal conviction in and of
itself is punishment-carrying real consequences for those who carry a
criminal record. And such systems still involve incarceration of indi-
viduals if they are cured of their mental illness with time still remain-
ing on their original sentences.
Equally absurd is the idea that allowing for consideration of mental
illness in the mens rea element of a crime abolishes the need for any
insanity defense under the Eighth Amendment. 365 The mens rea ele-
ment of a crime generally assesses only whether persons intended to
complete the act performed. For example, did the person intend to
kill a human? It does not assess whether the person was so delusional
that they did not understand the act was wrong. Such a standard does
not protect the delusional person who believes, for example, the act
359. See, e.g., State v. Delling, 267 P.3d 709 (Idaho 2011); State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342 (Utah
2001).
360. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1001 (Mont. 1984). The one main issue that Korrell did not
address, which later relevant cases did, see, e.g., State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 888-89 (Mont.
1993), was whether finding someone competent to stand trial is sufficient to allay concerns about
abolishing an insanity defense. It is not sufficient because such competency hearings only con-
sider whether a person is mentally capable of meaningful participation in a trial, not whether
mental incapacities affected culpability at the time of an alleged offense.
361. Korell. 690 F.2d at 1001.
362. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); see also supra notes 29-54 and
accompanying text (discussing the importance of control in the Eighth Amendment analysis).
363. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551-52 (1968) (White, J., concurring), 567 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
364. See Korell, 690 P.2d at 1001.
365. See id. at 996-1002.
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was in mortally required self-defense or defense of others-beliefs
that would qualify for an insanity defense under the M'Naghten or
Model Penal Code tests. "[A]n insane person will virtually always
have the mental state required by the law under [this type of mens rea
standard], even though the defendant suffers from severe mental der-
angement, such as an extreme and bizarre psychotic delusion."366
Thus, the mens rea standard still allows for punishment of those not
culpable for their actions-in direct contradiction to principles of
Graham.
Furthermore, the Montana Supreme Court did not subject the issue
to a full Graham-like analysis, and the parts of the Graham analysis
that it did employ were faulty. The court erroneously argued that the
lack of penal justification could be overcome because the concern
over protecting society trumps the concern over punishing the inno-
cent. The case even approvingly quotes a dissenting Justice from the
Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Stacy: "In a very real sense, the
confinement of the insane is the punishment of the innocent; the re-
lease of the insane is the punishment of society." 367 Such reasoning
cannot stand under more recent Supreme Court precedents such as
Graham that explain: "[i]ncapacitation cannot override all other con-
siderations, lest the Eighth Amendment's rule against disproportion-
ate sentences be a nullity." 3 6 8 Any punishment of the legally insane is
disproportional. Montana's analysis also ignores the fact that this ten-
sion is easily fixed because civil commitment in a mental hospital with-
out criminal conviction both protects society and avoids punishment.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, abolishment of the insanity defense cannot survive a Graham
analysis. Where, because of a diseased brain, people "are so mentally
deranged as to lack the mental capacity to comply with the law," 3 6 9
there is no penal justification sufficient for punishment. Any punish-
366. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 374 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, Associate C.J., dissenting). The
opinion quotes Pohlot, which explains that only in very rare cases will a legally insane defendant
fail to pass a purely mens rea test. "As the House Report stated: 'Mental illness rarely, if ever,
renders a person incapable of understanding what he or she is doing. Mental illness does not, for
example, alter the perception of shooting a person to that of shooting a tree."' United States v.
Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting 130 CONG. REc. H9674 n.23 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1984)). It is the true context of actions and the ability to rationalize that are generally affected
by severe mental illness. See id. ("Similarly, a man who commits murder because he feels com-
pelled by demons still possesses the mens rea required for murder.").
367. Korell, 690 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State v. Stacy, 601 S.W.2d 696, 704 (Tenn. 1980) (Henry,
J., dissenting)).
368. Graham v. Florida. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
369. Herrera, 895 P.2d at 372 (Stewart, Associate C.J., dissenting).
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ment of these individuals is therefore disproportional and unconstitu-
tional. The fact that there is currently clear national consensus
regarding the mandated existence of the defense is only icing on the
cake-albeit allegedly important and heavily weighted icing. 370 The
lack of a penal justification is independently sufficient to find criminal
conviction of the insane cruel and unusual. The fact that the princi-
ples underlying an insanity defense have been acknowledged in at
least some recognizable legal form for centuries is also an indepen-
dently sufficient originalist ground for finding the abolishment of the
insanity defense unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.37'
The Court's obliteration of the death is different doctrine in Gra-
ham has opened the door for Eighth Amendment-based categorical
protections from punishments beyond death. Among the first through
that door should be this nation's severely mentally ill-beginning with
categorical protection from any criminal punishment for those who
did not understand the nature of their actions, did not understand the
wrongfulness of their actions, or could not control their actions at the
time of their alleged crimes. Such constitutional protection of insanity
defenses is logically required by Graham and would be an important
first step in stemming the insanity of some American insanity laws.
370. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
371. See supra notes 265-76 and accompanying text.
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